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ABSTRACT
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS-
INTERPRETIVE ACTIVITY IN AMERICA
SEPTEMBER 1990
PHYLLIS FARLEY RIPPEY, B.G.S., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor John Brigham
This dissertation calls on the public law field to
expand its focus beyond courts, especially the Supreme
Court, to take account of constitutional interpretative
activity taking place elsewhere. The field's narrow
focus on courts leads us astray in our attempts to
explain American constitutionalism fully. The talk on
the Constitution taking place in the academy, the
Congress, the community, and state legislative forums
is part of the activity which has mistakenly be ignored
as interpretive practice by the public law field.
This work restructures the framework of analysis
to explain the larger picture of American
constitutional politics. I do four case studies of
this politics using textual qualitative analysis of
conference papers, legal briefs, proselytizing tracts,
and legislative testimony to look at an academic
conference, community struggles against corporate
vi i
disinvest, Congress's interpretive practice, and a
state legislature's vote against calling for a
constitutional convention.
The first study is of a conference held in
celebration of the Bicentennial of the Constitution.
This conference expands sources for constitutional
meaning as it recalls 19th century Reconstruction era
constitutional debates. The second study is of
movement activity to establish a constitutional
property right to stem the tide of corporate
disinvestment. Workers and communities have
constructed a constitutional claim that they have a
right to save jobs. Congress' institution of its own
law offices to join the Supreme Court in constitutional
debate is the subject of the third study. With the
formation of its own law offices, Congress has
established control over its constitutional arguments
before the Court. Finally, I look at testimony taken
by the Connecticut General Assembly on the call for a
second constitutional convention. This testimony
reveals a quasi-religious attachment of Americans to
their document. Rather than representing a deep
commitment to democracy, however, it appears to
represent an impediment to it.
vi i i
All of this activity is part o£ American
constitutional interpretive activity but traditionally
has not been understood as such. In giving new
definition to this activity, I expand the framework of
analysis of constitutional interpretive activity and
our understanding of it.
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CHAPTER 1
.
INTRODUCTION
More than two decades ago, Judith Shklar described
the ideological implications of the legal frame for
perceptions of rights and constitutionalism. 1 Shklar's
theory of "legalism" in America explained why our
political culture is especially receptive to the talk
about the Constitution. Traditionally in America
according to Shklar, legal forms have channeled
political action as well as legitimated it. The
ideology of legalism, according to Shklar, encourages
us to think of law as out "there" and separate from
politics. Shklar suggested new ways to think about law;
to regard it as part of a social continuum. Shklar
said that
At one end of the scale of legalistic values
and institutions stand its most highly
articulate and refined expressions, the
courts of law and the rules they follow; at
the other end is the personal morality of all
those men and women who think of goodness as
obedience to the rules that properly define
their duties and rights. Within this scale
there is a vast area of social beliefs and
institutions, both more and less rigid and
explicit, which in varying degrees depend
upon the legalistic ethos. 2
1 See Judith Shklar, Legal ism (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1964).
2 See Judith Shklar, Legal ism, p. 3.
2The challenge to integrate law and politics that
she laid down was taken up a decade later by Jonathan
Casper- and Stuart Scheingold.* These scholars
brought new perspectives to the public law field with
their examination of law in American society. They
placed legal thinking within the context of politics.
At the beginning of the last decade, in an essay
reviewing the state of the research on law and society,
Richard Abel 5 declared the original paradigm of liberal
legalism exhausted and challenged scholars to construct
a new one by challenging the ideology directly in
attempting to develop alternatives. In addition to his
critique, Abel suggested ways to discover the needed
alternatives. Among them was the suggestion that
sociolegal scholars should broaden the meaning of
justice itself by, "Stepping outside the ideology
through which legal institutions seek legitimation and
asking what the public views as just and where it
perceives significant injustice in the operation of
3 See Jonathan D. Casper, The Politics of Civil
Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
* See Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
s See Richard L. Abel, "Redirecting Social Studies
of Law," Law and Society Review 14 (1980):805.
3law."- it is somewhat surprising in a democracy that
the idea ot seeking input from the people on their view
of law is offered as a new approach. Nevertheless, it
is, but the new approach that Abel called for is not
more gap studies that implicitly endorse formal legal
institutions' view of the law by checking to see if
public knowledge measures up to it. 7
The gap study perspective continues to bind even
those scholars who aim their attention at the people
rather than their institutions. Michael Kammen* made a
study ot the cultural impact of the United States
Constitution in an attempt to describe the place of the
Constitution in the public consciousness and symbolic
life of the American people. He said of his study,
"...I consider this a study in popular
constitutionalism, by which 1 mean the perceptions and
mispercept ions, uses and abuses, knowledge and
ignorance of ordinary Americans. 1,9 Kammen notes that
in 1920, the Constitution and the Declaration of
6 See Richard L. Abel, "Redirecting Social Studies
of Law," p. 828-29.
7 See Austin Sarat, "Legal Effectiveness and
Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistance
of a Research Tradition," Legal Studies Forum 10
(1985) :23.
a See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
Itself (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).
9 See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
Itself, p. xi.
Independence were taken out of a vault at the State
Department to be put on display in order to bolster
American morale in resisting bolshevism. " (m a war
of words, we brought out our biggest guns.) This
instrumental use of the Constitution was taken up by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service around this
same time. The increase in immigration into the United
States combined with growing isolationist and
xenophobic attitudes encouraged the U.S. government to
use knowledge of the Constitution as both a test of
understanding of the American system as well as a gate
at its shores. Successful immigrants had to prove a
"fair" knowledge of the document with the INS deciding
what was fair. In order to exclude "undesirable"
aliens, trick questions were often asked. For example,
which grocery stores are allowed to use false scales?
Or, double questions might be used allowing the
inspector to accept or reject an answer according to
the applicant. Underlying these abuses of
constitutionalism, however, was a sense that those
living here must be or become "American" and the
Constitution was at the heart of Americanism. 11
10 See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
U s elf,, p. 223 .
11 See Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go Of
P- 236.
5Kammen's meticulous account of the American
culture of popular constitutionalism puts its emphasis
on popular misconceptions of constitutionalism and its
American variant. Sotirios Barber has explored another
kind of constitutional consciousness. Rather than
checking public awareness against some constitutional
scoreboard, Barber suggested the theoretical foundation
tor an individual's being "constitution minded" on her
own terms. Barber says, "...a court cannot simply tell
us the meaning of this Constitution; we have to see it
for ourselves. Courts cannot achieve a constitutional
state of affairs on their own." 12 Research in the
public law field, however, with its focus on courts -
especially the Supreme Court and on its product, the
judicial opinion - rather than all the interactions of
the whole process, encourages the myth of legalism that
includes the idea that law is the special province of
experts and can be known and understood to the public
only through their mediation. Barber's call for
everyone to be "constitution minded", not just the
experts, is part of a larger concern of some in the
public law field that research expand the domain of
what is understood as the study of the law.
12 See Sotirios A. Barber, On What the
Constitution Means (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1984), p. 213.
6Speaking to the topic of the appropriate direction
Of law and society research twenty years after those
constructs were melded into a scholarly association and
journal,- Susan Silbey and Austin Sarat called for
attention to the minutiae of social life. In spite of
American legalism's claim to the rule of law, at the
periphery of American society - in small towns, rural
places, working class neighborhoods we can see people
resisting "the penetration of official legal norms as
they construct their own local universe of legal values
and behavior." 1 * Silbey and Sarat attribute this
scholarly attention to the post-Viet Nam, Post-
Watergate America in which our highest legal
aspirations have been disappointed. They conclude
that, "We need to stop trying quite so hard to come to
terms with that ineffectiveness and to start studying
what legal life is like in the vast interstices of
law." 13 John Brigham's recent research on popular
13 The Law and Society Association and The Law and
Society Review .
14 See Susan S. Silbey and Austin Sarat, "Critical
Traditions in Law and Society Research," Law and
Society Review 21 (1987):173.
18 See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."
Paper presented to panels on "Public Discourse and Law:
The Role of the Citizen," Midwest Political Science
Association, April 13-15, 1989; and "Legal Culture and
Legal Claims," Law and Society Meetings, Madison,
Wisconsin, June 8-11, 1989.
7"attitudes" about the law versus expert opinion on the
law has already moved into the domain suggested by
Silbey and Sarat. Focusing on images of and
"attitudes" toward property rights, Brigham explains
the marginalization of the public in an area of special
importance to them. The public becomes marginalized
because it does not have access to the discourse of the
law and bureaucracy which acts upon them rather than
with them. Brigham writes that
The authority of legal claims and the power
of the government over property lies in
determination about the way the world is, not
about how people feel about it.... All
assertions of property rights are subject to
correction and refinement by experts but the
authority of the poor to participate in the
discussion is substantially diminished by a
lack of autonomy and the technical discourse
of welfare property. XG
While the courts, especially the Supreme Court,
continue to command the most attention when the
Constitution is discussed, there is a palpable
constitutional consciousness in popular American
politics that takes on the Constitution on its own
terms that should command our attention as well. This
was most recently apparent when 250,000 people marched
in Washington to assert their view that Roe v. Wade was
ls See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice,"
p. 23-24.
8correctly decided.- After all, the courts as passive
agents can initiate nothing themselves, someone else
must think first in constitutional terms and bring the
claim to the Court only later, if at all. Yet this
aspect of constitutionalism is too often unexamined in
the leap to look at what courts ultimately legitimate
as constitutional.
In addition, often when there has been integration
of law and politics in the scholarship, the tradition
in public law has been to look at lawyers, courts, and
judges from the outside exposing the politics within.
This is the particular contribution of the legal
realists who showed that far from the law's being
discovered on some special cloud above politics from
which it occasionally rains down, law is in fact the
result of the play of politics itself. Sheldon Goldman
has pointed to four of those intersections: policy
choices are made within a political context, decisions
result from group bargaining, justices come to the
17 April 1989. Whether this demonstration
influenced the Court or not we do not know but the
capacity of a demonstration to influence the timing if
not the content of a decision has been documented.
According to David O'Brien, Chief Justice Hughes
refused to hand down Powell v. Alabama (1932) in order
to end picketing that had surrounded the Court. See
David O'Brien, Storm Center (New York: W.W. Norton &
Co., 1986), p. 277.
bench from an active nuhiir nt-L p dl c life, and politics generate
the issues brought to the courts."
My thesis extends this model to explain the
interaction of law and politics taking place outside
judicial institutions. I am interested in political
activity generated by strongly held popular beliefs
about the purpose and promise of the Constitution.
Political activity li ke this may be pursued through
legal institutions but does not begin or end with
judicial opinions. The right-to-life / r ight-to-choose
movements, the comparable worth movement, and the anti-
violent pornography movement are representative of this
sort of constitutional politics as are the four case
studies developed in the chapters that follow. This
research is what Martin Shapiro describes as the
essential task of the political scientist - undertaking
"the careful description of what one real person says
to another real person, when, how, and why." 19
My interest, therefore, is in noting popular
conversations on the Constitution. These conversations
are not aimed at mining the Constitution for a pre-
i a See Sheldon Goldman, Constitut ional Law: Cases
and Essavs (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1987), pp. 3-4.
19 See Martin Shapiro, "Wither Political
Jurisprudence: A Symposium." Western Political Science
Quarterly 36 ( 1983 ): 541-8
.
existent right and then staking a legal claim on it.-
The tact of a constitutional tradition is important.
The written text, used to justify judicial review,
provides us with words to read and discuss.
Consequently, the Constitution must be understood not
simply as rules but as a way of talking about things
political. John Brigham argues that
...it is necessary to distinguish between the
rules which designate certain procedures and
the grammar which reveals the practices on
which the procedures are based. The impact
of grammar on a decision is far more subtle
and potentially more revealing than the rules
that we traditionally look to for insight
into the role of law in judicial
interpretation
.
21
The text and commentary provides the opportunity for
what James Boyd White calls "interpretation as
action." 22 And, it also keeps the discourse on rights
and constitutionalism public.
This dissertation expands the domain of the public
law field as it responds to the searching self -analysis
that began in 1982 at the Western Political Science
20 For that activity, see, for example, Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Ri ghts Seriously (Cambridge Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1977).
21 See John Brigham, Constitutional Language: A
interpretation of Judicia l Decision (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978).
22 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their
Meaning: Consti tutions and Reconst itutions of Language.
Character, and Community (Chicago and London:
University of Chicago Press, 1984).
Association meeting in San Diego and continued into
1984, 1987, and 1988 at annual meetings of the American
Political Science Association. At these meetings there
were round-tables which asked about the future of the
public law field in political science. The Amherst
Seminar's answer in The legal studio vnr»^ * several
years ago was that the field should break out of the
old confines of public law analysis with its emphasis
on the appellate opinion by advocating joint research
projects that come at the study of law and politics not
only from more than one perspective but from more than
one discipline. Rogers Smith of Yale reiterated the
question in the Spring 1988 issue of the American
Political Science Review . 2 " Smith advocated applying
the innovations in theory of the parent discipline of
political science to the public law field. For
example, he wondered what explanatory power the "new
institutionalism" has for the study of law and
politics. Its insight is that there is a symbiosis
between institutions and political actors that
influences the perspectives of both the institution and
the actor. Smith notes that what goes before -
previous judicial opinions - can determine not only
23 The Legal Studies Forum IX (1985).
2 * See Rogers Smith, "Political Jurisprudence, The
'New Institutionalism,' and the Future of Public Law."
82 ( 1988 ): 89-108 .
future opinions but what gets into court at all. The
past development of the institution can determine which
voices are heard in court. Smith explained that
Obviously, no group is likely greatly tointluence an institution that will not attendto its voice.
... Thus, accounts of selfinterested rational calculations and thebehavioral regularities they are thought togenerate will have limited explanatory powerif they are not sensitive to how legacies ofpast decisions lead people to think theirinterests should be so defended. Neglect of
these factors may also prevent us from seeinghow social definitions of interests appear
much less rational, and much more vulnerable
to alteration over time, when their origins
are ident i f i ed
.
2
s
William Connolly suggested this view several years
before when he pointed to the importance of the "terms
of political discourse." Connolly said then that
the language of politics is not a neutral
medium that conveys ideas independently
formed; it is an institutionalized structure
of meanings that channels political thought
and action in certain directions. Those who
simply use established concepts to get to the
facts of political life, those who act
unref lect ively within the confines of
established concepts, actually have the
perceptions and modes of conduct available to
them limited in subtle and undetected ways. 26
23 See Rogers Smith, "Political Jurisprudence, The
'New Institutionalism, • and the Future of Public Law,"
p. 98-99.
26 See William E. Connolly, The Terms of Political
Discourse
.
2nd Edition (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1983).
For some groups, like out-of-work steelworkers
, trying
to get recognition tor their idea of a right to the
industrial property in their community, a "community
property right," was an achievement in itself. ="
Their struggle fits the critique of the Critical Legal
Studies- movement whose claim is that determining what
appears, or is accepted, as rational when making a
rational choice is the whole game. Brigham's work
points here as well when he reveals welfare recipients'
language being "corrected" or ignored by their
caseworkers as they attempt to explain their own sense
of their rights. 29
Underlying these calls for innovation and new
direction is a growing concern that the law schools are
winning the battle to cover the public law field as
they re-define it narrowly as doctrinal analysis and
jurisprudence. We see this in the university as well
when undergraduate courses on constitutional law are
taught by political scientists as mini-law school
courses utilizing the case method. This narrow
27 This struggle to establish in the polity the
idea of a right to retain disinvesting industries as a
constitutional right is detailed in chapter two within.
2S Critical Legal Studies is a movement of legal
scholars from elite law schools who are calling for a
new left perspective on the law.
29 See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."
definition constrains our understanding of American
constitutional interpretive practice by riveting our
attention on the domain of the legal profession. Harry
Stumpf attempts to move us away from the purely
judicial decision and process mode by expanding the
arena of the political jurisprudent to judicial
politics that include bar association presidents,
prosecutors, and law enforcement officials. 30 While
casting the net further afield, this approach like
those coming before continues to leave out of the
analysis ail actors not formally part of the legal
process. Public law analysis should include these
latter participants as well.
This study of the popular politics that, as
constitutional interpretive practice, inform the way we
understand the Constitution as a society is responsive
to calls from within the field for new direction. It
does so, in Judith Shklar's words of twenty-five years
ago, by breaking through the ethos of legalism to
expose the other important junctures of law and
politics in American society. This research follows in
the tradition of the work of Jack Peltason and Martin
Shapiro who first called for a "political
jurisprudence." Peltason did the path breaking work in
30 See Harry Stumpf, American Judicial Politics
(San Diego: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, Publishers,
1988) .
15
his rmirrg *n t. h e ponricai Pm,.^ in whlch he
described judges as participants in the political
process.- He put his emphasis on process rather than
product (i.e., the appellate opinion.) with this
changed structure of analysis, Peltason looked at the
federal courts as part of the larger politics of
interest group struggle. Martin Shapiro endorsed this
work in his 1964 essay, "Political Jurisprudence-
giving this new approach its name. 32 Shapiro
contributed further not long after in Law and Pnlif^.
;n the Supreme Court by analyzing the Supreme Court as
an agency of government
.
3
3
This new frame of reference
helped to further refine political jurisprudence.
In spite of these insights which recall the
earlier vision of Jerome Frank who had long before
called our attention to the "upper court myth" in the
1930's and 1940's, public law has still not weaned
itself enough from the appellate decision as the focus
of its attention. 3 + To call our attention not only to
31 See Jack Peltason, Federal Courts in the
Political Process (New York: Random House, 1955).
32 See Martin Shapiro, "Political Jurisprudence."
Kentucky Law Journal 52 (1964):294.
33 See Martin Shapiro, Law and Politics in the
Supreme Court: New Approaches to Jurisprudence (New
York: The Free Press, 1964).
34 See Jerome Frank, "The Cult of the Robe,"
Saturday Review 29 (1945):12.
the decisional process but also to the forces and
influences that impinge upon that process, Harry stumpf
titled his recent text Amer.cn .mH Ma|1 p -mir .
rather than "judicial process." m this work, stumpf
reviewed research that explains the legal profession,
judicial selection, the state and federal court
systems, and the criminal justice system in terms of
the polity that constitutes those systems. Austin
Sarat extended this model to what he calls "extended
case discussion" which looks at the politics that lead
up to, encompass, and lead away from the case itself.
"
What forces align to transform a political claim into a
legal one? What is the purpose of litigation in a
particular case? A means? An end? What politics
eventuate from the decision?
By attending to these details, we see the larger
picture of law and politics. More important for the
field, it is attention to these details that is the
particular forte of political scientists. The law
schools can remain riveted to the appellate case but
political scientists must explain that case in the
context of politics. Further, political scientists
must explain the role that law, itself, plays in
3S See Austin Sarat, "Legal Effectiveness and
Social Studies of Law: On the Unfortunate Persistance
of a Research Tradition," Legal Studies Forum 19
( 1985 ) : 23
.
politics. Several years ago, Walter Murphy- called
on political scientists to regain their rightful place
as interpreters of the Constitution and the politics
that surround it. in this vein, Murphy developed his
own model of constitutional interpretation that he
called a "modified departmentalism." 37 There he
posited a theory of separation of powers and
constitutional interpretation that gave to each branch
an ultimate say in those areas of greatest concern to
it
.
Clearly, the calls for the integration of law and
politics have not fallen on deaf ears in the public law
field but they have still elicited too few responses
that are not structured around legal institutions and
judicial doctrine which serves to reinforce the purely
legal model of constitutionalism. Louis Fisher is one
who does go beyond this purely legal model to examine
the executive and legislative branches for their
constitutional interpretive practices. 38 He offers
evidence of interpretive activity in all three branches
3S See Walter F. Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret?"
The Political Sci ence Teacher 49 (1986):10.
37 See Walter F. Murphy, "Who shall Interpret?
The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,"
The Review of Politics 48 ( 1985 ): 401-23
.
38 See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988 ) .
as
that contributes to our full understanding of the
Constitution. while this activity by the three
branches is not new, the understanding of it all
contributing to constitutional interpretation is.
Fisher shows that the Supreme Court is neither the only
constitutional interpreter nor the final one.
Stuart Scheingold is another who stimulated new
thinning some years ago as he exposed new truths about
the etficacy of rights struggles using litigation
strategies. He concluded then that legal strategies,
as they aim deep at the transformation of cultural
awareness and assertion, work only as political
mobilization mechanisms. Nevertheless, he argued,
litigation is viable politically because, even though
it does little to affect institutions and power holders
per se, it does serve as a rights consciousness-raising
force popularly. Using doctrinal analysis put in its
historical and political context, Jonathan Casper
showed this as well. He, like Shklar, argued against
the tradition of viewing legal doctrine in isolation
from the larger society of which it is a part. Casper
responded to the lament that the courts should stay out
of politics and stick to deciding legal questions on
legal grounds with the assertion that constitutional
issues do not simply involve fine points of law but
rather the allocation of values. Legal tools -
reasoning by analogy, stare decisis, etc. - can be
brought to Dear on the problem but constitutional
interpretation itself remains always a political
problem that should not be separated from political
analys is
.
For Harvard Law Professor, Martha Minow," a
written constitution is the starting point of
discussion. it is not so important that particular
actions are protected or prohibited but rather that we
are constituted as a community by the Constitution and
with it have a basis on which to make claims about what
is or is not embraced by that community. This is also
what Sotirios Barber- 0 is talking about when he calls
on everyone - not just judges and lawyers - to be
"constitution minded." Barber does not deny the
special authority of judges but he also calls on us as
citizens to form and express our own view of "what the
Constitution means."
We must decide for ourselves what the Constitution
means because our view contributes to what Gerald
39 See Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover," Yale Law Journal 96 (1987):1860.
*° See Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution
Means (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984 ) .
Garvey- calls
.'const itutional bricolage." Bricolage
is the French word lor the process by which a
craftsman fabricates
-make-do- solutions to problems
as they arise, using a limited and often severely
limiting store of doctrines, materials and tools..."-
With constitutional tools the judge or craftsman can
build a consistent body of constitutional doctrine.
Constitutional bricolage - what materials and tools are
available to the judge - reflects the larger process of
society's trying to maintain its consistency and
identity over time which Garvey calls society's syntax.
Because society's syntax informs and limits judges'
doctrinal choices, important politics take place at the
level of constructing and reconstructing that syntax.
The Constitution, then, should be understood not as a
blueprint for a community but rather as a facilitator
of social conversation on what constitutes the
community, not the document. 43 Consequently,
interpretive constitutional discourse is important
constitutional politics.
See Gerald Garvey, Constitut ional Bricolaqp
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1971 ) .
* 2 See Gerald Garvey, Constitutional Bricolage
,
p . 5 .
* 3 See Martha Minow, "Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover" for further discussion of this
idea
.
When someone
- political activist, scholar,
legislator, citizen
- claims to know the promise or
parameters of the Constitution, she is participating in
constitutional interpretive practice. The aim is not
always to affect specific policy outcomes but more
often to construct the arena within which those policy
choices must be made. This is the struggle to shape
the community's definition of itself. it is the
struggle for the ascendant idea or, in Garvey's words,
to determine society's syntax. This is the heart of
constitutional politics.
Constitutional politics are politics that focus on
and make claims about the meaning and promise of the
Constitution and thereby of American life. My
overarching thesis is that the public law field has led
us astray with its contribution to our understanding of
American constitutionalism. It has focused on the
Constitution in the appellate courts, especially the
Supreme Court, when the full picture of American
constitutional politics is more than this. Therefore,
this dissertation looks at the politics that often
point toward the Supreme Court but do not begin or end
there. The Court is one obviously very important arena
in which these politics are played out. There are
others, however, that contribute to the picture: the
Congress, the academy, the community, and the state
iorums tor che amending process as examples. The
chapters ot this dissertation are devoted to each o£
these arenas.
Chapter One turns to the academy to follow the
discourse on the Constitution of those scholars who
teach the future Supreme Court clerks, practitioners,
judges and justices as well as those who write the
record of that discourse - academic lawyers and legal
historians. This chapter otfers an analysis of a
Bicentennial Conference on the Constitution. Here, my
attention is on the vocabulary of the discourse and the
conference theme of "difference." The conference,
entitled "Rights and Constitutionalism in American
Life," was sponsored by the Department of History of
the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and The
Journal of American History
. Employing textual
analysis of the conference papers, I show what these
scholars consider to be the important popular discourse
on the constitutional text. While the legal profession
dominates constitutional interpretation, it has not
shut ail others out of the discussion. The
pervasiveness ot popular American rights consciousness
which these scholars reveal is a little studied feature
of American legal and constitutional life.
Chapter Two builds on the conference by focusing
on an outgrowth of one of the conference papers. One
of the conferees, labor lawyer and political activist
Staunton Lynd, has put into practice the theoretical
discussion of the rest of the conference. The case
study is qualitative textual analysis of workers' and
communities' proselytizing tracts, amici briefs,
journal articles, and newspaper accounts of political
activity. i also interview the chief strategist,
Staunton Lynd in order to put constitutional politics
in context. This is a study of the use of eminent
domain by communities as a mechanism to realize their
claim of a constitutional right to industrial property.
The genesis of the idea of this constitutional right
was born in the steel communities of Youngstown, Ohio
and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I trace the fight
against corporate disinvestment within these two
communities as well as outside them where this
constitutional claim has surfaced. The communities
which are pursuing this course against corporate
disinvestment are threatening to use their eminent
domain power to bring to bear their own constitutional
interpretation
.
Chapter Three examines the commonly held notion
that the Supreme Court has the final say on the
Constitution. Franklin Roosevelt endorsed this view
when he urged Congress to pass his New Deal legislation
even with misgivings and "let the Supreme Court worry
about the constitutionality."- At another time,
William 0. Douglas said, "The Court is really the
keeper of the conscience, and the conscience is the
Constitution."- Douglas- colleague, Robert Jackson,
also laid claim to the Court's finality when he said in
QEQwp v. Al l en , "[the Supreme Court] is not final
because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final." it is not just the Court that
has this perception, however. When someone feels
injured in some measure, the commonest cry is "I'll
fight this all the way to the Supreme Court!"
In IMS y. Chadha,** the Supreme Court declared the
legislative veto unconstitutional. However, since that
decision was handed down in 1983, Congress has
incorporated 53 legislative vetoes into 18 pieces of
legislation at last count.
«
7 This fact of life in
Washington has to be taken account of if we are to know
the full picture of constitutional interpretive
Donald Grant Morgan, Congress and the
Constitution; A Study of Responsibility (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1966), p. 15.
* a Comment in an interview with Eric Sevareid.
Quoted in Michael Kammen, A Machine That Would Go of
Itself (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986).
462, U.S. 919 (1983).
* 7 See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues.
p . 234 .
activity. Chapter Three explores Congress- use of its
specially established law firms to articulate its own
interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine.
The purest constitutional interpretive practice
is, of course, the amendment process. As Judge Gibson
reminded us in EaHih v. Hanh," it is the people who
have the ultimate say on the Constitution. Chapter
Four looks at what the people had to say in Connecticut
when asked to call for a second constitutional
convention. In periods of dissatisfaction with Supreme
Court decisions or with congressional acts there is a
resurgence of constitutional amendment politics. Most
recently these politics have arisen over the issue of a
balanced budget amendment. Unlike those involved in
the movement politics of community property rights, the
activists here are usually elites. Like their
forebears who wrote the original document, these
interpreters are comfortable wielding power and
therefore one might expect them to have the confidence
to take the document, itself, into their own hands and,
if necessary, remold it at a second constitutional
convention. This is the ultimate in constitutional
interpretive activity. From the testimony taken in
Connecticut before that state's decision not to call
for a second constitutional convention, however, we can
48 12 Sergeant and Rawle (Pa.S.Ct.) 330 (1825).
see that these elites are fearful rather than confident
that the constitution could be safely taken in hand by
today's interpreters.
The politics in these four chapters are emblematic
of the constitutional interpretive activity of that
segment of the American polity that defines its
politics by the Constitution. Together they form much
of the larger picture of American constitutional
interpretive practice that takes place outside formal
legal institutions. Ultimately, these constitutional
politics make significant contributions to the syntax
of American constitutionalism. However disparate the
arenas, however disparate the actors, they are all
bound together by a single document and a shared sense
that they all know what the language of that document
means. What is of interest to us as political
scientists, however, is not so much the content of
their interpretations but that they all are
participating in constitutional interpretive activity.
This is the political activity that contributes to the
larger picture of American constitutional politics
which this dissertation examines.
CHAPTER 2
THE BICENTENENNIAL IN THE ACADEMY
Nineteenth Century blacks, women, and labor
activists held conventions, gave speeches, wrote
pamphlets and each other proclaiming their alternative
vision of the promise of the Constitution. In some
cases they were convincing to us all (e.g., black men
should have the vote), in other cases only to each
other (e.g., the Constitution already included women).
In every case, however, they were involved in giving
definition to the document. Scholars at a 20th Century
Bicentennial Conference re-examining these views - both
those that won out and those that did not - give new
voice to their vision.
Introduct ion
This chapter explores the kind of constitutional
consciousness suggested by Sotirios Barber -- an
attitude of aspiration toward reaffirming the
Constitution's ways as one's best conception of the
good society. Barber says that
This constitutional frame of mind is poorly
distributed and either cannot exist or cannot
generally be known to exist where genuine
reaffirmations of the Constitution are
replaced by a widespread acquiescence in the
imposition of some monopoly. Although we can
agree with what others say about the
Constitution, it is simply impossible for
someone to £ell_ us the meaning of this law
The particular focus of this chapter is a
bicentennial conference on the Constitution. The
conference also provides an opportunity to take up
Richard Abel's challenge to construct a new paradigm
for the study of law discussed in the introduction.
Abel's call for new perspectives reverberated
throughout the disciplines studying law and society
especially loud in the year of the Constitution's
Bicentennial.- Constitutional study that year
stimulated a self reflection. m The chrnnin, „ f
Higher Sflttfiatlaa
, constitutional scholars lamented the
dearth of fresh scholarship in response to the
Bicentennial celebration
.
3 When Project '87 was formed
a decade before through a joint effort of the American
Political Science Association and the American
Historical Association to promote the Bicentennial of
the Constitution, the goal for the project was to
stimulate serious new academic research on the
1 See Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution
Mea,ns (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984), pp. 197-198.
2 See Stewart Macaulay, "Images of Law in
Everyday Life: The Lessons of School,
Entertainment, and Spectator Sports," Law and
Society Review 21 (1987):185.
3 See Karen Winkler, "Scholarship," The
Chronicle of High er Education. March 4, 1987.
Constitution and to improve public understanding of its
history and place in contemporary society. According
to those attached to Project '87, the latter goal was
largely realized. Where the project failed, however,
was in fostering the hoped-for new scholarship.
Analysis of the impact of the Constitution's
Bicentennial celebration was that it was making little
impression on research in the fields where the
Constitution is most studied - history, law and
political science. *•
This desire for the Bicentennial to generate new
and different scholarship was shared by the historians
and academic lawyers who organized a conference at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst in the fall of
1986 to explore the social history of American
constitutionalism. While the legal profession
dominates constitutional interpretation, others are
joined in the debate. 3 The pervasiveness of American
rights consciousness, which is evidence of this, is a
4 See generally Karen Winkler, "Scholarship."
s See Frank S. Lucash, ed
.
, Justice and
Equality Here and Now (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1986); Judith Baer, Equality Under the
Constitution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983); Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman,
Constitutionalism (New York: New York University
Press, 1979).
little studied feature of American legal and
constitutional life which was addressed at the
conference
.
Sponsored by the Department of History at the
University of Massachusetts in conjunction with TJ^
Jovial of frne rl rm Hist ory (which devoted its December
1987 issue to these conference papers), the conference
took the title
"Constitutionalism in American Life."
Thirteen historians and legal scholars gathered to
explore the general theme of constitutionalism as well
as relationships between group identity and
constitutional history. This chapter addresses several
questions as a way of placing the Bicentennial
Conference in the context of American interpretive
practice. When they spoke of constitutionalism, to
what did they refer? Where did they look for evidence
of popular rights consciousness? Did they break out of
the traditional structure for constitutional analysis
(i.e., judicial doctrine)? In employing textual
analysis of the conference papers, one can mark the
concepts informing the constitutional discourse taking
place outside formal legal institutions, as well as the
activity that discourse inspires.
From conversations with the conference
organizers,* it was clear that their vision for the
conference was that it produce scholarship different
from the conventional practice of constitutional
history which has failed to account for the
pervasiveness of American rights consciousness in the
face of legal positivism. Therefore, they looked for
evidence of constitutional consciousness and practice
outside the context of ahistorical doctrinal analysis
and beyond the development of the institutions born of
the document.
The conference was broken into two symposia.
Symposium I approached constitutionalism from the
perspective of the impact of the Constitution on
American development over 200 years in each of four
areas: economic life, politics and government, race
relations, and diplomacy. Symposium I, with its more
traditional approach to constitutional history, is not
addressed directly in this paper. It is significant,
however, that the organizers of Symposium II chose to
set it apart from Symposium I in order to emphasize
6 Hendrick Hartog, University of Wisconsin Law
School, Madison and Robert Griffin, Chairman,
Department of History, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst
.
that their conception of constitutionalism and
constitutional scholarship was different.
Where one symposium painted American
constitutional history in broad strokes emphasizing
main themes that explained institutional, economic,
race and international relations vis a vis the
Constitution, the second looked to the minutiae of
social history to reveal American constitutional
culture. in the organizers' words, "The purpose of the
symposium would be to explore some relationships
between group identity and constitutional discourse and
debate through the course of American national
history".- The organizers of this symposium held the
view that not only have perceived understandings of
constitutional entitlements and disabilities shaped
group identities, but public understandings of what the
Constitution guarantees have been changed fundamentally
by the participation of diverse social groups. In
other words, not only have rights activists taken cues
from judicial opinions, their activity, as well,
informs our common sense of what the Constitution
7 Conference announcement.
means. Furthermore, there is evidence that popular
constitute politics influences U.S. Supreme Court
opinions a
The claim of conference organizers that their
scholarly endeavor is different from traditional
constitutional scholarship with its attention on
doctrinal development is one measure I apply to the
conference. Specifically, I consider what it means
that a new (different) perspective on the Constitution
is being offered. What, if anything, in these papers
is different from other research on the Constitution?
Part of the claim to difference is rooted in an
additional aspiration of the organizers to use the
conference for "vocabulary building." I, therefore,
also look for evidence of that effort. The conference
offers its analysis of American political culture
surrounding the Constitution and, at the same time,
forms a piece of that culture itself. This is
especially true since the organizers aspired both to
explicate ideas already held, but obscured to us, as
well as to influence the structure and content of
further thought on the Constitution.
a See Leslie Friedman Goldstein, "The ERA and
the U.S. Supreme Court," Research in Law and Policy
Studies 1 (1987) :1 .
While the conference papers can certainly stand on
their own, they are of most interest when taken as a
whole. it is their combined purpose that tells us
about the Constitution in the academy. The organizers
of the conference did not want to leave it to chance
that their view of constitutionalism as rights
consciousness would be addressed in an undirected call
for papers. Consequently, they sought out scholars
whom they knew to be involved in work on rights
consciousness and the social history of the American
Constitution. The result of this deliberate
organization is an endeavor that is larger than the sum
of its parts. What we learn from each paper is
enhanced by the order in which it is given as well as
by its being one of several bricks in a scholarly
edifice of constitutionalism as rights consciousness.
This method of organization is itself unusual. While
it is not remarkable that specific scholars be invited
to participate, it is clearly a different enterprise
when a gathering is organized around a general call for
papers rather than as this one was. In the latter
event, both the content of the papers and the
orchestration of the conference claims our attention
because both tell us something about current American
constitutional scholarship.
The Cnn ferpnrp Papprs
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Rice University historian Thomas Haskell,* laid
the foundation for legitimating the activity of the
conference itself. His paper opened the discussion
with an exploration of competing views in
jurisprudence. He posed natural rights philosophy
which holds that law can and should be deduced from the
higher principles of the laws of nature against the
Nietzschean view, or historicism, which denies the
possibility of establishing any such transh istor ical
and transcultural standard. Haskell's purpose was not
to resolve this debate, but to show the ground in
between where a debate on rights can stand.- That is,
he sought to expose the territory between two competing
views where the discourse of rights is in fact taking
place and where that discourse makes sense to us even
in the absence of a consensus on natural law
philosophy. Haskell grants histor icism' s claim that
rights are social conventions. This does not, however,
9 See Thomas L. Haskell, "The Paradoxical
Persistence of Rights Talk in the x Age of
Interpretation, 1 » Paper presented at The Journal
of American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.
10 For another attempt to map the ground
between ideologies in the search for justice see
Richard Rorty, Contingency. Irony & Solidarity
.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
mean when we understand rights in this way that we do
not have substantial knowledge. He asserts, "By
mapping more precisely the pale beyond which morality
is irredeemably historical, we do of course concede
some territory to the cr iter ionless wilderness.... But
we also demarcate the zone within which rights and
other claims to objective moral knowledge can enjoy
something like 'universal' sway.... [And this] is also
all we need"
.
11
Haskell is saying we do not need to have a
conception be "true to an order antecedent to and given
to us" in order to justify it. He offers a territory
between Reason and History where we can root our
conceptions of justice, rights, and equality. This
territory is described by persisting social
conventions. These conventions, however, are open to
rational criticism and are flexible in response to
changing technology. Haskell opens his conception of
"technology" to include events like the post-1750
Western movement toward humani tar ianism. This,
according to Haskell, came about not because the Golden
Rule was unknown before but because what was conceived
of as natural and unchangeable came to have new
meaning. What before had been seen as not available to
11 See Thomas L. Haskell, "The Paradoxical
Persistence of Rights talk in the *Age of
Interpretation,'" p. 34.
human intervention came to be within the power of
humans to affect. Thus, a change in technology (the
power to help others) precipitated a change in the
conventional conceptions of how one treats one's fellow
humans. in giving to the meaning of rights the concept
"social conventions" Haskell suggests where we fall off
the track in our attempts to give meaning to other
concepts. We think we must limit our choice to one of
two extremes - Reason & Natural Law or
Interpretivism/Historicism. We live, however, in
between and it is there that we should look for meaning
in our discourse.
Conference case studies in women's, blacks',
workers' and the family's perceptions of and
mobilization around rights issues looked for that
meaning. Women, blacks and workers comprise groups
that pursued formal legal recognition of their rights
as well as developed within this activity their own
conceptions of what rights, constitutionalism, and
justice mean. They and their activity is of interest
not simply because they claimed to have rights but
because they worked to influence the meaning society as
a whole gave to these rights claims. Their sense of
what the Constitution means came from within themselves
and from the debates they held, not just from positive
law. This is emblematic of James Boyd White's
"interpretation as action. »" Cerfcainiv mc tainly, these groups
acceded to the authority of the courts but that is
different from saying they embraced the interpretation
the courts put on the Constitution. Inviting papers
dealing with women, blacks, workers and the family, the
conference organizers showed that constitutionalism
defined as rights consciousness permeates society.
This reinforces the conference claim that
constitutional practice is not the special province of
the courts alone; that important aspects of
constitutional meaning can be found in doctrinal
analysis but the full flowering of the Constitution
takes place in social discourse.
Social historian Ellen DuBois 13 of the State
University of New York at Buffalo echoed Haskell's
theme of the conventional nature of rights. Again the
claim is made that rights must be understood in their
historical setting in order to make full sense of them
and. so that we are not drawn into the misconception
that previous ideas about rights are rooted in Nature
1 2 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose
Their Meaning; Constitutions and Reconst itutions
of Language. Character, and Community (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
13 See Ellen Dubois, "Girls Just Want to
Have Rights: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage and the
U.S. Constitution, 1820-1875," paper presented at
The Journal of American History Conference at
Amherst, Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.
or Reason rather than in the conventions and politics
of their time. DuBois' contribution is to trace the
development of the demand for political equality for
women through nineteenth century feminist debates. Her
case study peels back the top layer of the women's
rights struggle (the results) and exposes the politics
and circumstances affecting and shaping the women-
suffrage movement. DuBois shows that the ultimate
triumph in the 19th Amendment was not the original aim
of the earliest women's rights activists. By the end
of the original women's rights struggle, rights came to
be claims against the state, a negative force against
governmental power centered in the call for a
constitutional amendment. Early on, however, women saw
rights as positive guides for a benign government
already inherent in a constitution that did not require
amendment to include women. Early feminists called
upon women to assert the rights already there. DuBois
sets straight the historical record to show how
conceptions of rights come from social debate (the
struggle for the ascendant idea) by recapturing the
specifics of that debate.
The claim that her research is different comes
from where she looks to find the discourse of rights.
Scholarship that focuses on formal convention reports
and judicial doctrine leaves the impression that the
one
way an age or culture understands itself is in
coherent voice. Those historical artifacts, however,
reveal more about the politics than the social history
and culture of their time. This Bicentennial
Conference called our attention to the discourse
brought to the women's rights conventions and the
struggle that took place there rather than the
judgments or compromises that came out of those
conventions. if rignts are inve£Jted ^ conventional
meaning that, while flexible, is still rooted in past
conventional understanding, then it is important to be
fully clear about what that past understanding was. it
is meaningful in today's struggle to know that a view
resonates with the past even if it were a past view
that failed to carry its own day.
The question that remains, however, is how to
recapture that full discourse. For the participants in
this conference, the answer is to look at the whole
field of ideas surrounding the Constitution that were
taken seriously in their own day. Our culture and
social conventions are formed not only by the ideas or
compromises that win out, but also by those that do not
gain ascendancy and by the tensions in between. x « In a
The classic work depicting the arguments of
the losing side is Herbert J. Storing's account of
the arguments against the U.S. Constitution
promulgated in 1787. See Herbert J. Storing, What
the Anti-Federalists were mr (Chicago and London:
postscript, DuBois recalled two speeches made at the
1878 woman Suffrage Convention that, in contrast with
each other, show the range of the rights discourse
within the women's movement. Her reading of nineteenth
century feminism is that many did not see rights as
narrowed to a principle for prohibiting government
action. The politics that led feminists to the
strategy of a woman's suffrage amendment have obscured
their other discourse on rights, equally important to
their day and ours, that sees rights as inherent, not
given, and as a positive guide for government.
Columbia University historian Eric Foner 's"
research on 19th century blacks confirms DuBois' claim
of a common sense of rights as positive guides for
government rather than a negative claim against
government. Foner, too, looked at convention speeches
as well as private letters of newly freed blacks to
show that their conception of freedom was rooted in
their sense that participation in politics — to which
they had a right — was their best protection. The
Declaration of Independence and, after the 14th
Amendment, the Constitution made their claims to
University of Chicago Press, 1981).
XB See Eric Foner, "Rights and the
Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and
Reconstruction," paper presented at The Journal of
American History Conference at Amherst
Massachusetts, November 7-8, 1986.
political equality with the white man meaningful. By
looking at the record they left in their private
letters and Reconstruction Convention speeches, Foner
uncovered the popular constitutional consciousness of
19th century blacks. while blacks failed to impose on
the rest of society their interpretation of
constitutional protections as issues of federalism and
racism surfaced, they nevertheless formed their own
constitutional conceptions and tried to foster their
ideas in others. The conference shows that there was
ongoing popular discussion of the meaning given to the
Constitution in the 19th century and that, while
political expediency swept aside these discussions at
the time, they left a legacy of
popular constitutional consciousness and conceptions of
rights that continues to be called on today.
This Bicentennial Conference's view of
constitutional politics as a positive force assumes
that law is a logical and fertile arena within which to
bring about needed social change. This is, of course,
problematic. As discussed in the introduction, Richard
Able objects to this wholly positive view because, with
its focus on law and social change, it "distracts
attention from law and social stasis". 16 This concern
" See Richard L. Abel, "Redirecting Social
Studies of Law," Law and Society Review 14
(1980) :805.
was shared by University of North Carolina historian
Leon Pink as he raised the issues of faise
consciousness and cooptation in relation to
constitutional activism." Kink also looked to private
papers and convention speeches as well as union
pamphlets to reveal labor's historical perception of
the Constitution.
From the beginning of the labor movement, workers'
public self-definition has been shaped by legal and
constitutional principles. The problem in this for
workers, according to Fink, is that their commitment to
work within the framework of American laws and economic
institutions has meant that they have had to contend
with definitions of their activity made on others'
terms. Even so, however, workers did share the vision
of women and blacks that even if the courts could not
see it, the Constitution did speak to them and their
needs. Their special problem was translating the
Constitution into the language of collective rather
than individual rights. It is at this intersection
that DuBois' attention to a vision of rights as a
positive force for the welfare of the community as a
X-7 See Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, and the
Law: Trade unionism and the problem of Collective
Action Within the American Constitutional Order,"
paper presented at The Journal of American History
Conference at Amherst, Massachusetts, November 7-8.
1986.
whole becomes especially important to workers' claims
that collective action was within the spirit of the
Constitution. Having a problem different from that of
women and blacks, however, workers pursued a different
legislative and legal strategy which left them at the
mercy of conservative courts for the definition of both
their rights and their activity.
Concentrating on the Samuel Gompers era in the
history of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), Fink
drew a distinction between early labor history and that
of the "Gilded Age." Artisanal republicanism had
greatly helped to get the Constitution ratified but as
the legal institutions came to be controlled by
employers, law and the legal system took on an entirely
different meaning for American workers. The
Constitution was no longer their shield but rather the
weapon of the capitalist. Looking at the convention
speeches and union pamphlets to map this change in the
constitutional consciousness of American labor, Fink
showed American labor's frustration with judicial
"reinterpretation" of the Constitution. The
interpretation they themselves gave the document,
evident in their speeches and pamphlets, imported to
the Constitution a sense of rights that embraced and
protected collective action. Labor could neither
persuade the courts to their view, however, nor leave
aside constitutional activity. plnk . a examination of
Labor
>. constitutional discourse reveals the American
labor movement long puzzling over how to take advantage
of the law and the opportunities available through the
political structure.
Like workers and the Constitution, the family and
the Constitution has problematic connections, what is
most interesting about Harvard law professor Martha
Minow's conference paper,- noweverr ig nQt the
connections she shows but what she reveals in the
skeleton of her scholarship on the topic, m a
prefatory note, Minow explained that she had done
little actual research on her topic because she had
devoted most of her time to "shaping a sensible set of
questions connecting
• family and the themes of this
conference."" Consequently, hers is a real "working
paper" and allows us the greatest insight into the
attempt to bring a different perspective to the study
of American constitutionalism. Minow was not sure it
made sense to include the family in those groups that
la See Martha Minow, "Rights Consciousness
and American Families," paper presented at The
Journal of American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts, November 7-8,1986.
1B See Martha Minow, "Rights Consciousness and
American Families," p. 1.
made their claims and drew their identity from legal
institutions. Consequently, she approached her task
for the conference hesitatingly.
in laying out her concerns and questions
explicitly, she cast in sharpest relief the themes and
purposes of the conference. Where are rights located
in the family? m the individual? The group? who
should answer this? Courts? Political activists? The
family, itself? she wondered how to dig beneath legal
texts for lay consciousness about the meanings of
rights and for contrasting sources of meanings about
rights. This shows us two things. First of all it
shows that the challenge to historians and academic
lawyers to find popular constitutional consciousness is
a sensible task, but not an easy one. in addition,
Minow's being at first stumped as to where her sources
lie lends credence to the claim that this scholarship
is indeed different for at least some of the
participants.
Ultimately, Minow strained to fit her
understanding of law and the family into the
conference's theme of rights consciousness. In fact,
she concluded, "Rights consciousness is an intriguing
but problematic lens through which to re-examine the
history of the family.... ... she commented eariier
that there is more evidence of the metaphor of
-family-
in rights discourse (fraternity, sisterhood, community)
than there are rights metaphors in the discourse on the
family where the language is more that of "duty- than
"rights.
-
Minow-s conclusion that the American family
has not articulated a self-conscious constitutionalism
leads to other issues. What was clear to Minnow was
"that dimension of rights consciousness and the family
that concerns the popular conception of the family as
the locus for children's learning - including their
learning about rights—
, m addition to learning
about rights, however, 19th century children were to
learn from the family environment a respect for
authority and self-restraint. Rather than showing the
development of a rights consciousness, Minow's research
on the family shows some of the tensions within the
larger constitutional system. In addition to rights,
there are duties. In addition to the individual, there
is the family or community. Interests, needs and
rights overlap here.
The conference's four case studies revealed not
just the fullness of the spectrum of constitutional
20 See Martha Minow, "Rights Consciousness
and American Families, - p. 31.
2X See Martha Minow, -Rights Consciousness and
American Families," p. 31.
consciousness in American life out the tensions within
it as well. Fink was especially good at capturing the
dilemma of integrating individual and collective rights
claims. What happens to the individual when she is
subsumed within the union or the family? There are
multiple loci of rights which surface most clearly in
labor's discourse of rights. Fink's study shows that
workers have, themselves, been ambivalent about where
they wanted their rights to lie. This ambivalence has
persisted into contemporary labor history.
Historian and lawyer, Staunton Lynd" brought
labor's historical struggle with constitutionalism into
the present with his study of a steelworker union
local's attempt to save jobs through appeal to
constitutional rights (detailed in Chapter Two). Here
was constitutional rights consciousness at work within
the conference's model. Lynd's study, using public
speeches, union newsletters, and pamphlets, documented
the genesis of a new constitutional claim formulated
and promulgated outside legal institutions. In Lynd's
words, "What one saw in Youngstown and Pittsburgh
during the decade considered in this study was a
community of worker-intellectuals doggedly pursuing the
a 2 See Staunton Lynd, "The Genesis of the
Idea of a Community Right to Industrial Property in
Youngstown and Pittsburg, 1977-86," paper presented
at The Journal of American History Conference at
Amherst, Massachusetts, November 7-8, 1986.
a>urces
idea of a community right in industrial property, step
by pragmatic step, arriving at proposals fully as
radical as any previously proposed, yet framing
them democratically, and in the American grain, in such
a way as to bring others along with them.""
The success Lynd claimed for the project was
limited one. A lack of adequate financial reso,
deprived the workers of realization of their
constitutional claim. For the conference's purposes,
however, the steelworkers ' union was hugely successful.
Their experience showed what it is like to tap a
constitutional consciousness. Furthermore, it
confirmed Haskell's thesis that we can call on our
understanding of social conventions rather than natural
law to give authority to our rights claims. Lynd said
the steelworkers' local was successful at least in
setting the terms of the debate because the workers
framed the discourse of rights "in the American grain."
The workers' claim of a constitutional right's being
involved in their struggle was successful because it
resonated with middle-America's sense of what the
Constitution promises.
What is especially interesting about the
steelworkers' success is that the Pittsburgh/Youngstown
" See Staunton Lynd, "The Genesis of the Idea
of a Community Right to Industrial Property in
Youngstown and Pittsburg, 1977-86," p. 47-48.
community accepted the steeiworker local's
constitutional interDrPt-^inn -p e at o in spite of its formal
rejection by a court. implicit in popular
constitutional activity is the idea of multiple
constitutional authorities. if the courts were the
only recognized authority on the Constitution, rights
activists would devote themselves to talking only to
judges and lawyers instead of to each other and the
public- m her paper, University of Connecticut law
professor Carol Weisbrod showed how religious groups
have historically successfully competed for authority
over the meaning of the Constitution." Weisbrod's
thesis is that the Constitution as an institution has
to some degree recognized multiple authorities and to
some degree made room for them. The tensions between
the claims of families and communities and individuals
tell us something about the place for multiple
authorities in the American constitutional order.
Weisbrod recalled that from our earliest moments as a
people, the church has competed with the state for
»* See Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogue
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988) for an excellent explication of both the
normative and empirical argument against the
Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter.
2 a See Carol Weisbrod, "Family, Church and
State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious
Authority," paper presented at The Journal of
American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.
authority over various aspects of our lives. This is
especially obvious in the area of family law. The
history of religious groups' struggles to define 1st
Amendment religious claims on their own terms shows a
competition among these groups, themselves, over
whether the amendment should be understood to mean the
state is to leave the church alone in its recognized
sphere or whether it is to recognize the church's and
the state's overlapping concerns and authority. it is
part of our constitutional practice, then, to submit to
the courts but our sense of what the Constitution means
to us as individuals or as members of groups can and
does come from other sources as well. Weisbrod's study
showed not only the fact of this but also that the
American constitutional system has accommodated this
fact
.
Part of the orchestration of the conference
included inviting Georgetown University Law Center
legal scholar, Mark Tushnet, to offer a counter view.
While Tushnet was not as negative or critical as he was
expected to be, 2e he nevertheless presented a different
view of the nature and consequences of constitutional
consciousness. Tushnet saw the ambiguity and open
texture of the Constitution as problematic for rights-
20 From author's conversation with Hendrick
Hartog of the University of Wisconsin Law School,
October 23, 1986.
conscious groUps rather than as a broad foundation on
which to stake claims. He came to this conclusion
after researching the point in the NAACP's history when
W.E.B. DuBois resigned from that organization over his
differing view of the strategy blacks should pursue to
gain full equality. Tushnet saw the struggle of those
who tried to give content to the constitutional concept
of equality as divisive and distracting. He said, "The
Constitution provided a framework within which
political alliances could form, but its ambiguities
meant that alliances formed to achieve equality might
fragment when some participants found it necessary to
specify more precisely what they meant by equality". 2 ''
Rather than seeing constitutional consciousness as the
tie that binds, Tushnet saw skillful political action
as holding alliances together and, consequently, did
not see a difference between a constitutional and a
political commitment to equality. To Tushnet, the
Constitution seems more of a hindrance than a help when
it comes to achieving rights.
27 See Mark Tushnet, "The Politics of
Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal
Protection Clause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles
Hamilton Houston, " paper presented at The Journal
of American History Conference at Amherst,
Massachusetts November 7-8, 1986.
Conclu.S i nr.
The Conference articulated multiple themes and was
not as coherent as this research may suggest. One of
the organizers had hoped that the conference would be
an opportunity to do some vocabulary building but he
did not see much of that taking place.- what he had
in mind when he spoke of vocabulary building is not
clear but it appears that the conference implicitly, if
not explicitly, defined its own terms, it defined
constitutionalism as rights consciousness when it
separated one symposia from the other and invited
participants to the second symposium who spoke of
constitutionalism only in terms of rights. Further,
the conference defined rights as social conventions.
This can be inferred from the fact that no debate
emerged in the conference about what rights are. In
addition, Haskell's model of rights discourse rooted in
the "in between territory where we live" was implicitly
taken on by all participants.
The effort to be "different" was an important
issue for the conference. Its goal was to generate
scholarship that looked in places other than courts for
the discourse on rights. Minow posed the question
2S Conversation with Hendrick Hartog, November
14, 1986.
ss
s
explicitly when she asked if conceptions of the home as
the castle in popular literature are more telling
statements of rights consciousness than the legal
doctrines. she also asked how clients in lawsuits felt
about the way lawyers framed their suits asserting
rights claims. These questions, as well as others,
stimulate new thinking about the Constitution. They
point us to new sources for understanding American'
rights consciousness. in addition, the conference'
way ot looking at popular constitutional consciousnes
was different from a gap study. The conference was not
interested in comparing popular and formal legal
constitutional thought. it offered the social history
of popular constitutional discourse as constitutional
activity itself with a life and legitimacy of its own
whether or not it echoed that of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the conference, itself, is an example
of American constitutional rights consciousness. It
documented some of the history of American
constitutional culture as it formed a new piece of it.
By looking at the event of the conference as well as
its content, we can see significant features of
constitutional interpretive practice overlooked in
traditional American constitutional scholarship.
CHAPTER 3
.
THE COMMUNITY ON THE CONSTITUTION
.
EMINENT DOMAIN AND CORPORATE DISINVESTMENT
Faced with plant closings and the loss of Jobs
after years in the factory or mill, steelworks in
Youngstown, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and
toolmaxers in New Bedford, Massachusetts claim their
property is being taken when corporations disinvest.
They believe they have a constitutional property right
to participate in business decisions that affect them.
Furthermore, they believe their community's power of
eminent domain provides them with the mechanism with
which to exercise this right. This chapter explores
the political and legal practices that these ideas have
generated
.
Myths of Righ ts - Myths of Chang e
When Stuart Scheingold explored the politics of
rights a dozen or so years ago, he suggested a standard
by which to judge the efficacy of the law as an
instrument for social change. In Scheingold's opinion,
"If litigation can play a redistr ibutive role, it can
be useful as an agent of change. If not, its political
utility must be heavily discounted." 1 He showed that
litigation can generate rather than resolve social
1 See Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
conflict and therefore » [t ]he direct linking of rights
remedies, and change that characterizes the
^His must... be exchanged for a more complex
framework, the nfc^, which takes into
account the contingent character of rights in the
American system..- The legal and political activity
recounted in this chapter constitute attempts to
exchange the myth of rights for the politics of rights.
The myth is overcome when social activists look to the
courts as means not ends and attempt to maintain their
struggle as a fundamentally political rather than legal
one. To do this, political strategists of movement
politics must define the terms and issues of the debate
rather than allow lawyers to do so. in the cases
discussed here, this means that rather than seeking to
have a court tell a corporation planning to relocate
that it cannot move because of that court's
interpretation of the Constitution, the community
itself, by invoking eminent domain asserts its own
sense of a constitutional right to industrial property.
Eminent domain, even though a legal tool, has a popular
aura to it. Courts are extremely deferential to the
2 See Stuart Scheingold, The Politi cs of Rights
,
p . 7 .
a legal mechanise for realizing constitutional claims
that rest primarily ln fch , ^ ^
courts and judges.
MY interest in studying some o£ these
struggles is not in predicting the ultimate outcome in
building a new constitutional consensus but rather i„
showing where and how this political activity is taking
Place. r n the folloHlng
t
based on a politics of rights that have been launched
against corporate disinvestment.
Disinvestment. The GanafciinUaPi andCommunity Property
Corporate disinvestment, put in its crudest form,
milks profits from a stable subsidiary in order to
expand a conglomerate's overall holdings. The problem
for the subsidiary company is that the profits syphoned
off by the conglomerate are part of the capital
necessary for its own upgrading and expansion.
Ultimately, the subsidiary company is left with a few
choices: to pressure its workers for wage concessions,
to move to a cheaper labor market, or to leave the
57
* See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Rr ?Hi» Y| i 64U.S. 112 (1896) and Berman v. Parker. 348 U.S. 28
( 19 54 ) .
industry altogether and exploit the plant's real estate
value. However, these are not the only reasons for
closing plants.
When management first began closing plants,
company spokespersons as well as analysts in the press,
attributed the shutdowns to the unfair competition of
foreign subsidized firms, excessive wage demands from
organized labor, and unreasonable Environmental
Protection Agency standards which raise costs and lower
efficiency, all explanations that excused management
from any responsibilities. These reasons began to ring
hollow, however, as companies chose to close plants
that were profitable. This has been most persuasively
described by Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone.*
Their economic analysis of the corporate practice of
disinvestment has radicalized workers and communities. 3
In the post-New Deal socioeconomic order, there has
been a consensus between management and labor that
labor's wages will be dictated by profit and in return,
as long as there is a profit, there will be jobs. When
corporations disinvest from profitable industries, they
are breaking this unwritten rule. Thus workers and
* See Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone, The
Deindustr ialization of America (New York: Basic Books,
1982).
See Gilda Haas, Plant Closures: Myths,
Realities and Responses (Boston: South End Press,
Pamphlet No. 3, 1985) .
ang
C°" tUS £eel i» attain, corporate
^investment and consider themseiyes ^ poiiticai
mainStream ^ th*> d ° -o. It is, nevertheless,
radical move for workers to try to have a say i
owners' decisions about property. In opposl|
disinvestment, workers are extendi™ nending the concept of
property ownership to include workers' and communities
investment in industrial property as social and
economic externalities .k., ,.ntie . They believe this investment
entitles them to participate in decisions about the
ultimate fate of industrial property in their
communities
.
Testing the Mettle nf rho steelworks.
Over the past dozen years, labor lawyer and
political activist, Staunton Lynd has documented the
story of steelworker locals' struggles to save jobs
through a campaign against corporate disinvestment
based on a politics of rights. His work is of interest
both because of his argument for a community property
right and because of the language and political style
he uses to make his case.
While he can speak as a lawyer, scholar, political
theorist, or urban planner, Lynd's target audience is
ordinary people and theirs is the language he uses.
When he £lrst wrote o£ ^ ^ ^ ^
explained that
Dlac^H
ati ° n
^
iCh Cl0Ses P lants in several
I f lear ns fr om its experience. By the
q
r f ° u
^
th closing the company acts with
^
cated Precision. m each of the
workers a^T^ tief' however ' rank and file?°*tl confronting a shutdown for the1
t ^ .
s ° :•• 1 try to even up the odds
help others.'
6111^ the Y™ to- story to
The story he tells is an old one but the analysis he
brings to it and the solution he offers are new.
According to Lynd, the first step in solving a
problem is to determine its root causes. When American
conglomerates began shutting down plants in the Steel
Belt in the late 1970's, workers at first simply
accepted management's explanations that the dumping of
subsidized foreign steel in American markets forced
managers to close the plants. According to Lynd, this
willingness of steelworkers to accept the owners'
business decisions came to an end when they saw
profitable plants being closed not only by diversified
corporations but also by traditional steel companies. 7
At this point, union and community leaders sought other
explanations, stopped blaming themselves, and developed
e See Staunton Lynd, "Towards A Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," Harvard Civil Riahts-
Civil Liberties r,aw Review 27 ( 1987 ): 1 .
7 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdowns
(San Pedro: Singlejack Books, 1982).
new strategies to hold the corporations accountable to
the communities where they operated." In Lynd , s words
"The collapse of the steel industry in Youngstown,
Pittsburgh and other communities of the industrial
heartland disrupted the implicit social contract that
had existed in these towns for a generation.- Workers
were no longer willing simply to accept owners'
decisions. Lynd's contribution to the struggle against
Plant shutdowns is to tell the Youngstown/Pi ttsburgh
steel story in numerous forums to make the claim of a
community property right meaningful in a liberal
political culture which values individualism and
individual property rights. 10
The steelworkers- response to the economic
disaster of closing profitable plants (albeit not
profitable enough for the parent company) was not
resignation to bad fortune but a deep sense of
betrayal. "Inarticulate assumptions about the
a See generally Gilda Haas, Plant glflgJlEfigjHYthS, Realities and Rgspon^ and staunton Lynd, TheFight Against shntrinWn
,
g y ' Lns-
9 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against shnHo^,
p . lb.
10 American political thought was not always
rooted in individualism. Jefferson's republicanism
posited a rule of law that served the greater good of
the community rather than the individual. For an
analysis of the theoretical development that culminated
in liberalism see "Notes," The Yale r.aw Journal 94
(1985) :694-716.
connection of the companies With the communities they
dominated were brought to the surface, examined and
discussed. An area that had symbolized toughness and
unreflective patriotism
... became the incubator of new
ideas about the rights of communities to industrial
property".» As Lynd describes it, for generations
People in the steel region of Ohio and Pennsylvania had
put down roots and devoted themselves, body and soul,
to making steel. This meant instilling the value of
unquestioning loyalty to authority; of accepting wide
economic inequality and the political inequality that
results; of accepting the transformation of the
institutions traditionally organized to serve the
individual into institutions that serve the industry -
the church, local and state governments. Perhaps,
most importantly this meant raising children to want to
go into the steel mill rather than to go away. The
interests and demands of the industry obscured the
individual's own interests. An early sociologist of
American labor, Margaret F. Byington, in detailing life
in the Pittsburgh steel community of Homestead at the
turn of the century wrote that
[The steel town's J men may be too worn by the
stress of the twelve-hour shifts to care for
their own individual development or too shorn
1 X See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 17.
commercial necessit-v t-h = ; society nor
These are the cultural roots of Lynd's community.
Steel was an integral part of the economic life of the
entire Monongahela Valley and of the neighboring
communities. For generations individual and community
identity was tied to the production of steel. As the
national and international economy changed in the early
1970 's, this economic bond came to an end.
Although the communities and workers could still
earn a living from the steel industry, as Lynd
explains, both old and new industry owners saw that
their desire for higher marginal profitability could be
pursued better in other locations and, in some cases,
in other industries. Even after the owners had come to
these conclusions, however, they continued to encourage
the workers in these communities to order their lives
around the belief that steel was there to stay. When
the workers came to realize the difference between the
owners' private plans and public sentiments, they felt
doubly betrayed: the companies had asked for and been
See Margaret F. Byington, Homestead: Th*
Households of a Mill Town (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1974), p. 184.
given concessions to increase profitability with the
usually lmp i icit
, and sometimes expllcitj pro[n . se Q£
continued operation.
in the Pittsburgh/Youngstown area, a coalition of
religious, labor and community leaders calling
themselves the Tri-state Conference on steel appealed
to the workers' sense that they had been betrayed to
make the concept of a community property right
meaningful. Their first attempt at assessing
obligations and rights in what had previously been
discussed only in economic terms was to write a
"pastoral letter- that, coming from the community's
moral leaders not only carried extra authority, but
also elevated the struggle above narrow political or
economic interests. The religious leaders in the
coalition were from the upper echelons of the churches.
The original Ecumenical Coalition was created by a
Roman Catholic Bishop, an Episcopal Bishop, and a
Presbyterian minister. In their pastoral letter, they
argued that
Industrial investment decisions ought to takeinto account the needs and desires of
employees and the community at large
Human beings and community life are higher
values than corporate profits. 13
13 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against shntdnwnffr
p. 37
.
This statement was the beginning o f a new conception o £
a constitutional community property right.
A sense of betrayal does not necessarily inspire a
community to pursue a constitutional claim, of course
Workers in youngstown, in fact, first decided that
there had been a breach of contract secured by an
"invisible handshake." They unsuccessfully pursued
this legal claim through conventional litigation.- In
Lynd's view, however, it was their sense of betrayal
that lead them to reexamine their ideas. Ultimately,
they concluded that what constitutes the general
welfare itself goes beyond business principles. The
pastoral letter is an expression of this sentiment. in
the words of the pastoral letter, "economic decisions
ought not to be left to the judgment of a few persons
with economic power, but should be shared with the
larger community which is affected by the decisions.""
Steel had provided work for the community but the
community had provided the atmosphere and local economy
that attracted and sustained the necessary workforce as
well as the infrastructure that industry needs,
communities commonly contribute externalities to lure
1 -4 United Steel Workers of Ame r ica. Local 1330 et
31, V, United States Steel Corporation. 492 F. Sudd . 1(N.D. Ohio 1980). ^ i—H***.
1 s See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdown^
•3 / •
industry. Sometimes the contribution is quite
generous. Por example, in return for picking
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania for the site of its VW Rabbit
auto plant, the Volkswagen Corporation was given $ 100
million in state and local government aid. The state
would finance a $ 10 million rail spur and give
Volkswagen a $ 40 million 1.75% long-term loan, while
local government would settle for tax abatements which
meant that Volkswagen would pay less taxes annually
than it charged for a single Rabbit."
The people in greater Youngstown and Pittsburgh
did not expect any corporation to stay in a business
that was no longer profitable, what they did expect,
however, was that if the current owners of the steel
plants wanted to leave the steel business, they would
do so without unnecessarily wreaking havoc on the
surrounding local economy. The workers and local
community leaders wanted steel to sell out rather than
just shut down and leave. The steel corporations, for
their part, did not want to sell because they could see
larger profits in selling off machinery and equipment
and turning industrial plants into industrial parks.
In addition, as David Roderick, Chairman of the Board
of United States Steel, explained that
16 See Robert Lineberry, Government in America 3rd
Edition (Boston Toronto: Little Brown and Co., 1986).
seUinu°th
ly
r°
Uld not be interested in
lln only tt s'uccessfllWT ° £^ ^
subsidized by the fedL^ 6Y We" mass ively
not, in other wordf lit
government. We are
subsidized competit'i^ f
SSted ln """"g
locations" " £ °r ° ur"lves at other
Roderick comment reflects managers traditionally
one-sided definition of subsidies, where direct loans
to communities to Keep industries from shutting down
would be considered subsidies, tax abatements used to
lure business to a community and the usual
externalities that communities often provide are not
considered subsidies.
When Lynd makes the case for industrial re-
investment where the workers are, called "brownfield
modernization,
« rather than building anew elsewhere on
the assumption that the workers will follow the jobs,
or "greenfield modernization," he argues that more than
economic costs must be weighed. He says that
A comparison of the costs to the company ofgreenfield modernization and brownfield
modernization is only the first step in an
adequate analysis. One must also consider
social costs. Even if greenfield
modernization were cheaper for the company,
it might be more expensive for society as a
whole. 18
" See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against shntrtn^.,
P • 137.
/" See staunton Lynd, The Fight Aa.in.f
Shutdowns, p. 37.
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community property activists argue that busines.
obligated to consider the costs to society as part o £
the cost or disinvestment. This would be following the
logic of the original decision to invest in a
particular community. At that time, subtr,^ fcom
the costs of starting up a business was the community's
contribution in the form of various economic
externalities. This was a kind of loan that could be
paid off only with the continued operation of the
Plant. Should the owners want to leave, that debt must
be added to the cost of leaving. Again, the debt can
be paid off only by the continued operation of the
Plant - if not by the original owners, then by the
new, local owners. According to this theory, the
original owners should not be allowed to leave without
first settling all their debts - including what they
owe the community.
After coming to the understanding of the problem
as Lynd describes it, the steelworkers raised new
questions. The Constitution speaks to private property
but also to public welfare. Do private businesses have
unfettered property rights or do communities that
foster businesses thereby have constitutional community
property rights that can supersede business decisions
to abandon them? Could the Constitution that is
popularly interpreted as the protector of individual
liberties, be interpreted as the protector of conununity
rights? would such arguments win in court? The last
is an especially difficult question since historically
the courts often found that workers' rights threatened
individual liberties and therefore the courts could not
support workers' claims.- The problem, as Lynd
explained it, is that "tslome things simply cannot be
quantified. The challenge
... is to find a precise way
to talk about values that cannot be measured.
The Tri-state Conference on steel responded to
this challenge by promoting a new conception of a
constitutional community property right. For a number
of years, the Tri-state Conference on steel had worked
to show communities that their right of eminent domain
already accorded them the power and the right to
participate in the business decisions that affect them.
They argue that communities have the right to take over
businesses that can be run efficiently when
conglomerates are milking them of their profits. in
19 See Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, and the Law:
Trade Unionism and the Problem of American
Constitutional Order," The Journal of American History
74 (1987) :904-925.
20 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against shutdowns
,
p. 33
.
turn, the community can set up a business managed by
workers in the business and other members of the
community. 21
While the public interest is not popularly
considered a community pr operty clght
, the power o£ ^
government at all levels to prot ect and to promote it
is recognized in the police power and the power of
eminent domain." In the last claU3e q£ ^^
Amendment a limit delineates the nature of that power:
"nor shall private propeity be taken ^ ^
without just compensation." Controversy about the
nature of the police power has often been associated
with the compensation issue. Pre-revolutionary
American republicanism is said not to have seen the
need for a just compensation clause in the
constitution. The republic of the Jeffersonlan ideal
with its spirit of civic-mindedness endorsed public
takings without compensation to further the common
good. This in turn furthered the purpose of government
according to the Jef f ersonians; leading people to an
understanding of what the good was. The just
compensation clause was put in the Constitution by
James Madison to discourage public takings. Even he
2 1 See Mike Stout, "Eminent Domain and Bank
Boycotts," 1 Labor Research Review 3 ( 1983 ): 48-56 .
22 See Munn v. Illinois 94 U.S. 133; 14 L. Ed. 77
(1877).
acknowledged the American tradition that believed in
furthering the common good through public takings,
however. Madison envisxoned the compensation clause as
having a narrow legal meaning that referred only to
Physical takings and was intended to apply only to
activities of the federal government. Early state
constitutions included just compensation clauses as
limits on gubernatorial power to take property. These
clauses were, in time, revised to limit the state
legislatures in this area. m all of these cases,
however, the fundamental principle was the question of
compensation not the legitimacy of takings."
By 1877, the United States Supreme Court was
considering a new definition of property, much broader
than Madison's narrow focus on physical property. in
Munn V, Illinois
,
24 the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for substantive due process which would come
to recognize deprivations of other than physical
property. While substantive due process refers to
inverse condemnation rather than eminent domain, its
doctrinal development has contributed to the
23 See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," 94 The Ya le Law Journal 3-fi94-7lfi.
24 94 U.S. 133; 24 L. Ed. 77 (1877).
constitutional definition of property generally which
in turn affects the doctrine of eminent domain.-
In both inverse condemnation and eminent domain,
the taking must be for public use. what constitutes'
Public use has come to be the heart of the debate about
eminent domain. Until 1954, the Court interpreted
public use to mean private property taken by the
government that would then stay in the public's hands.
This was most commonly the taking of land for roads,
schools, parks and other clear public uses. The
definition was considerably expanded in 1954 when the
Court in asman, y t P^rK^r 26 upheld Congress'
condemnation of private property in the District of
Columbia for urban renewal. Once the land was
condemned, it was sold to private parties for
development. Critics argued that the condemned
property must be used directly by the public but the
Court ruled that slum clearance and urban renewal
constituted public use since it served the public
welfare
.
2S Inverse condemnation is distinct from eminentdomain. Eminent domain involves the compulsory
transfer of property to the government. In contrast,
in an inverse condemnation, the government places
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of the property
through the police power.
2e 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
~ Kg v
-
Pr " r * Chnrrh
, mr^." the court
answered arguments that eminent domain used to promote
economic welfare could interfere with interstate
commerce by positing a three pronged test. First, the
compensation must enable the owner to taKe the proceeds
and use them to continue operations elsewhere. Second,
the condemnation must be for a legitimate end. The
Court held that sustaining the local economy and
avoiding municipal bankruptcy are valid government
objects. Third, the condemnation action must result in
local benefits which outweigh any incidental burdens on
commerce
.
Like all constitutional tests, £U^ raises as many
issues as it resolves, who's to say when a "local
benefit" outweighs "incidental burdens" on commerce?
What constitutes legitimate use? Critics of current
eminent domain law contend the law fails to establish
boundaries and therefore "anything goes." 28 Certainly
cases are considered in court using eminent domain in
new ways and unexpected places. Consequently, when the
owners of the Oakland Raiders decided to relocate their
National Football League franchise, the City of Oakland
attempted to stop the move through eminent domain.
27 397 U.S. 137 (1970) .
2 8 See Notes, "Public Use in Eminent Domain: Are
There Limits after Oakland Raiders and Poletown?,"
California Wester n Law Review 20 ( 1983 ): 82-108
.
As any football fan knows, however, the former
Oakland Raiders are now the Los Angeles Raiders.
Oakland was barred from the use of eminent domain in
this case. courts ruled that it failed to show that
the football franchise was essential to the economic
health and well-being of Oakland. The California
Supreme Court held, however, that owning and operating
a sports franchise may be a valid public use. There is
a consensus in the law literature that Oakland as well
as the communities opposing plant shutdowns have been
campaigning about legitimate public uses."
What the limits of public use are and what
constitutes a public use remain important political and
legal questions. Can a municipality or state condemn
property to promote economic welfare and then turn the
property over to private hands? When General Motors
announced plans to close its Detroit Cadillac assembly
plant, Detroit was faced with the loss of thousands of
jobs. General Motors agreed to stay in Detroit if a
suitable site could be found for a new modern plant
that required large acreage and easy access to major
2 9 See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of The Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," The Yale Law Journal 34 (1985):694-
716; Comments, Ohio Northern University Law Review XII
( 1985) :231-249; Comments, Albany Law Review 49
(1984) :95-130; Notes, "Public Use in Eminent Domain:
Are There Limits after Oakland Raiders and Poletown?,"
California Wester n Law Review 20 ( 1983 ): 82-108
.
highways. Eventually, a site was found in an old, well
established and tightly knit Polish neighborhood in
Detroit, hardly a slum or a scene of blight.
Nevertheless, the Michigan Supreme Court upheld
condemning the site on the grounds that protecting a
large number of dobs constituted a legitimate public
use
.
According to community property theorists, Detroit
had a property interest in General Motors and was right
in helping to relocate the plant within Detroit. While
Detroit did use its power of eminent domain to take
property in the hope of retaining jobs, this seizure
was carried out under the traditional conception of
property ownership. Detroit did not consider itself an
investor in General Motors when it made the site
available nor when it had provided other benefits to
General Motors over the years. The claim of the
community rights activists is that communities have a
tangible property interest in both the economic and the
social environment of their communities. Therefore,
corporate decisions that damage the social fabric of a
community exceed their own property rights.
Lynd's effort to talk about values that cannot be
measured leads him to analyze the social impact of
disinvestment on local communities and the people
living there. He frequently quotes ordinary
individuals who exDresi fh«i, j,° p s their dismay over the change in
their communities. "vou felt as if the mill „ould
always be there." "Most people couldn't believe it.
It was so huge and had operated so long and so many
people depended on it for their livelihood."" when
activists like Lynd talk to workers about a community
property right, they know what he means. These words
reverberate with their own sense of what the American
system promises. Community, like individualism, is an
American value.
Lynd makes it clear that the idea of a community
property right was not the construction of ivory tower
intellectuals. He writes that
I have deliberately placed rank-and-file
steelworkers in the center of the narrative.
I think that they belong there. it was a
steelworker
... who first talked ... aboutthe importance of modernizing mills in
existing steelmaking communities it was a
steel worker
... [who] first proposed
employee-community ownership of the mills
It was a Pittsburgh steelworker ... who while
serving as a Pennsylvania state legislatordeveloped the idea of a "Monongahela Valley
Authority" which could buy and operate steel
mills that private companies no longer wish
to run. 31
30 See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 16.
31 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shntrinwng
r
p. 11
.
In discussinq the st-r^t-*™y n rategy ot using eminent domain to
pursue community rights, Lynd argues that the
steelworkers. experience is quite similar to that of
those who established the Tennessee Valley Authority.
When private enterprise does not want to run a needed
business, the community can do it itself. "This was
believed to be the rhetoric with which the Tennessee
valley Authority had been created.... Middle Americans,
who would indignantly have rejected the word
'socialism' on the belief that private enterprise was
intrinsically superior to public enterprise, readily
accepted eminent domain as a pragmatic response to
disinvestment
.
1,32
Lynd, a left radical, believes in local democratic
control in which people understand what is happening to
them and have the information and power to influence
the decisions that affect them. His efforts have been
directed at both those in power and those without who
are living in the community. He wants to convince
those in power to make an effort to stem the tide of
economic crises. And he wants to educate the local
community about its economic history and its politics
in the hope of fostering more active and assertive
democratic citizenship. The usefulness of eminent
32 See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 25.
domain in the struggle against corporate disinvestment
depends on political and economic factors rather than
legal ones. There is little doubt that it is a tool
available to the communities as far as the law is
concerned. it remains to be seen whether communities
have the will to use it. 33
Writing on this topic several years ago, Yale r.™
Journal editors commented on several social and
economic considerations
.
=»« should communities begin to
take over corporations, it might encourage managers to
operate their plants less efficiently on the theory
that they always had a ready buyer if times got rough.
On the other hand, of course, workers may be more
efficient and productive when they have a financial
stake in a plant. Or might firms be unwilling to
locate in the first place in communities where other
plants have been condemned? Or might they be induced
to relocate there thinking the community would buy them
out if they wanted to leave. Of course, no firm could
be sure the community would do so and could risk a
great loss of trust and goodwill if it made idle
threats. In any event, the use of eminent domain is a
3 3 See Comments, Ohio Northern University Law
BfiyJjBJi XII (1985) : 231-249.
3 * See Notes, "The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the
Fifth Amendment," The Yale Law Journal 94 ( 1985 ): 694-716
.
last resort. Community property rights activists
would, no doubt, prefer to see firms maintain a
commitment to an area on their own.
The movement in Youngstown and Pittsburgh has had
little success in saving jobs. The Tri-state
Conference on Steel has yet to realize the saving of
any steel jobs but it has received a $600,000 grant to
study the feasibility of reopening one of Pittsburgh's
electrically powered steel furnaces." Lynd has a
broader view, however. He stresses the intellectual
transformation that has occurred, noting that
generations of American radicals have tried to present
the idea of community ownership in a manner acceptable
to their fellow citizens. Lynd believes that while the
struggle has not brought to fruition a constitutional
community property right itself, it has made the
conception of the right meaningful. He writes that
What the steel town communities of the
Mahoning and Monongahela Valleys have
witnessed in the struggle to save the millshas been a community of worker intellectuals
doggedly pursuing the idea of a community
right in industrial property, step by
pragmatic step, arriving at proposals fully
as radical as any previously suggested, yet
framing them democratically, and in the
American grain, in such a way as to bring
others along with them I consider that
the set of ideas that I have described
constitute the splitting of an atom that has
long frustrated those seeking needed
3B Conversation with Staunton Lynd August 26, 1987.
fundamental change in the Untied statesThis is no small achievement."
" S '
The steelworkers' activities have affected
communities outside the Rust Belt. Workers elsewhere
are learning and using the language of the community
property rights movement. The Midwest Center for Labor
Research has taken on the task of documenting the
social cost of unemployment due to corporate
disinvestment. Their purpose is to provide "[hlard and
reliable figures
... [to] help a broader range of
people understand the actual social costs of corporate
strategy. it helps large groups of people to coalesce
and to demand a role in the decisions involving
industrial development." 3 '' More and more organized
workers are unwilling to discuss business decisions in
purely economic terms. The director of the Midwest
Center for Labor Research writes about "moral and legal
questions" and sharpening "our sense of moral outrage."
Ultimately, he concludes it is "not 'moral' to not
intervene in what has been historically accepted as
'management rights. •" 3B
3S See Staunton Lynd, "Towards a Not-For-Prof it
Economy: Public Development Authorities for Acquisition
and Use of Industrial Property," p. 35.
37 See Dan Swinney, "Documenting the Social Cost
of Unemployment," Labor Res earch Review 1 (1986): 49.
See Dan Swinney, "Documenting the Social Cost
of Unemployment," p. 56.
The labor newsletters and community development
analyses of the current economic situation use the same
words. The proble, is corporate disinvestment. The
C °St 15 ZZZlMX disintegration. The solution is
dem°C^ t1r contro1 on the loc^J^mm^ level. The
idea is that communities have rights
, that are equal to
those of corporations. ** while organized labor is
central in the coalition supporting a community
property right, local business leaders in affected
areas are also feeling the compulsion to redefine their
role in the community. +°
Eminent Domain in New Bedford
A struggle against disinvestment in the last
decade that parallels the steelworkers • plight but has
had greater success is that of the United Electrical
Workers' Local 277 ( UE Local 277) and the community of
New Bedford, Massachusetts at Morse Cutting Tools.
Both the size and kind of the business is different but
39 See especially Labor Research Review articles
on plant closings in Vol. 1, Fall 1982; Vol, No 3,
Summer 1983; Vol. 2, No. 1 Fall 1986 and Gilda Haas,
Plant Closures: Myths. Realities and Responses .
AO See generally Dan Swinney, "Documenting the
Social Cost of Unemployment."
the nature of the proofen, and the response o£ the
workers and the conununity is si milar to that of the
steelworkers
.
The Morse Cutting Tool Company was a family owned
and operated business from its founding in 1864 until
it was taken over in 1968 by Gulf and Western. The
Plant was unionized in 1941 and enjoyed good labor
management relations; there were only six disputes
brought to arbitration and only one strike. Relations
between labor and management remained friendly until
1981 when Gulf and Western decided to take on the
unions in all its operations in an attempt to reduce
overall labor costs and increase its return on
investment
.
-* 1
First, the union local contracted with the
Industrial Cooperative Association (ICA), a
Massachusetts labor research group, to do an assessment
of the long term viability of Morse Cutting Tools.* 2
The union then asked Massachusetts Institute of
Technology economist Bennett Harrison to review the
study and decide whether he thought Gulf and Western
«* See generally Dan Swinney, "Documenting the
Social Cost of Unemployment."
* a Industrial Cooperative Association (1982).
"Investment Strategy and Morse Cutting Tool," Labor
Research Review 1 ( 1982 ): 18-23
.
was disinvesting from Morse.- The analysis Qf both
Harrison and ICA was that Gulf and Western was
disinvesting from Morse and that the unions' concerns
were warranted. At this point the union began to
educate the New Bedford community about the problem of
disinvestment and approached community leaders. it was
a union and a community struggle from then on. "There
were state and local political figures, members of the
Chamber of Commerce, community personalities - all
with different interests and certainly not uniform in
their support of militant trade unionism. But they
could become part of a common front against G&W's
policy of disinvestment."**
The cutting tool industry was in a severe
recession when in August of 1983, Gulf and Western
announced plans to either sell Morse or shut it down.
The union, UE Local 277, and the community then geared
up to find a buyer committed to maintaining the
business in New Bedford. On June 4, 1984, New Bedford
Mayor Brian Lawler announced the city would seize the
plant through the power of eminent domain and sell it
43 See Bennett Harrison, "Gulf and Western — A
Model of Disinvestment," Labor Res earch Review 1
(1982) :18-23.
** see Dan Swinney, "Documenting the Social Cost
of Unemployment," p. 10.
to a auaim ed buyer. This announcement was given
national attention and a buyer was found without Mki „,
use of eminent domain.
The buyer, however, was under-capitalized and
over-extended and, i n January 1987, fUed for
bankruptcy. Again the workers and community were
looking for a buyer who would keep the plant in New
Bedford. m the end, two buyers made bids on the
Plant. one was a St. Louis firm that wanted only the
machinery and planned to strip the plant and then
exploit its real estate value. The other was a firm
from Scotland that would invest in the plant and keep
it running in New Bedford.
With the decision solely in the hands of the
bankruptcy judge, the community nevertheless redoubled
its efforts to keep the plant open in New Bedford. The
union contacted everyone it could in St. Louis to
pressure that buyer to withdraw its bid, even taking
out a full page ad in the S t, Louis Post BjaBafcfih, The
ad was signed by 30 community leaders ranging from the
mayor of New Bedford to its U.S. representative to the
president of the Whaling City Youth Baseball League.* 0
Neither buyer backed out, and the St. Louis firm
estimated its bid at a million dollars more than that
of the Scotish firm. The bankruptcy judge, however,
4 a WE MeWS. July 20, 1987, p. 6-7.
estimated the difference as only about $100,000. Even
though the St. Louis bid was still larger, the judge
decided that the fate of 300 jobs tipped the scales in
favor of the buyer who would maintain the company in
the community.
The case of Morse Cutting Tools is significant
because it shows the viability of the concept of a
constitutional community property right. At one point
the city was willing to incur the expense of
condemnation proceedings and ultimately a federal
bankruptcy judge counted jobs and what they meant to
the community as more valuable than money in weighing
the two offers. The judge did not ignore the claims of
the Morse creditors but neither did he ignore the
claims of the community.
Unlike this bankruptcy judge, the federal judge in
the Youngstown breach of promise case had not been able
to find a basis in law for the community property right
claim. Even in that case, however, the judge saw some
justice in the claim. He said that
United States Steel should not be permitted
to leave the Youngstown area devastated after
drawing from the lifeblood of the community
for so many years. Unfortunately, the
mechanism to reach the ideal settlement, to
recognize this new property rich*- •
Notice that the judge says , mechanlsm ^
^
c.-u»ity property right , s „ nQt ^ ^ ^
laws. This ls significantly dlfferent £rom sayin?
>dea and the Constitution are mutually exclusive.
Clearly, like the communlties^ ^
this judge could make "sense- out or the claim, even if
he could not yet make "law" out of it."'
Concl lis
)
r.^
Enough towns have considered using eminent domain
to maintain local economies that its significance
should not be dismissed lightly.- In addition, the
United states Congress and eighteen states have enacted
legislation to restrict in some measure the free flow
of capital out of their borders. These bills have
ranged from requiring only 30 to 60 days notice of a
86
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4JT 1 Wor * e E s " f American, i.nr.i „t
^Dr-oi^ 198 0r eS r" r^'"" 492 Supp. 1
n ../
7 For a legal argument in support of Local1330 s suit, see Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson,Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the
Invisible Handshake,'" The University of Chicago LawReview 52 (1985): 4.
48 See Mike Stout, "Eminent Domain and Bank
Boycotts," Labor Research Review 1 ( 1983 ): 48-56
.
one
shutdown, to severance pay and f ring e benefits for
year. Most states require one year's notification of
intent to close. About three-quarters require some
sort of severance payment.- This activity suggests
that the view of what the Constitution promises is
changing and as such merits our attention.
Scheingold argues that a transformation of culture
is required for fundamental change. He has
reservations about the political relevance of legal or
constitutional rights strategies because he asserts a
rights strategy is unlikely to be socially
transformative. Rights strategies fail as agents of
change because they give a false sense of what the
problem and the solution are — the myth of rights
problem. in addition, and more fatal to the chance for
change, legal ideology undermines a vision of a more
communal social order. in the end, Scheingold stops
short of repudiating the politics of rights, however.
He looks "with ambivalent favor on approaches to change
that keep us in touch with liberal democratic
values in this context, the politics of rights can
be recommended because it is linked to the ethic of
See Richard B. McKenzie, Fugitive I ndustries
(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984).
rights but it is not caught up in the steriie aogmatism
of the myth of rights." 30
When communities use the power of eminent domain
to protect the communities' interests, they have
adopted a new approach to the politics of rights. it
is Structurally different from conventional rights
litigation and, therefore, may be useful as an agent of
change. Eminent domain is based on the idea of
community rather than individual interests. it is
exercised by groups of people responding to
socioeconomic or political, rather than legal,
considerations. Eminent domain, then, is compatible
with the communal vision that Scheingold finds
necessary for a fundamental change in our political
culture. Communities like Youngstown and Pittsburgh,
New Bedford, Detroit, and Oakland appear to have a
sense of this communal vision.
Just as using the power of eminent domain makes a
politics of rights strategy different from other
campaigns, Staunton Lynd's point of view encourages
people to take a somewhat different view of the law.
He uses the law as leverage — it is not the end
itself. He is attuned to the wider non-legal politics
BO See Stuart Scheingold, The Politics of Rights
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
in the whole struggle and shares Scheingold's view of
the law. Lynd says that
takes
6
?^
1
^^^6 ° f a law suit is that itthe action out of the hands of workersand tends to make them passive spectators
'
ITlhe very existence of lawyers and court;*"encourages people to believe that "if only weget into court" things will, somehow tCrnout differently. This faith Is misplaced?"
in evaluating the efficacy of legal tactics to save
jobs, Lynd concludes that
onToarfn^V^ be V8ry USeful when ifc !
h2%S?fV ^arger struggle, but should not
?n !
e?°n alone * Tne heart of resistanceto a shutdown must be the struggle of
workers, not of lawyers. 52
Lynd does not focus on judicial legitimation of
worker and community claims. As blacks and their
allies have sadly learned, custom and culture controls
our social practices in ways that courts cannot even
begin to touch on their own. Consequently, Lynd wants
people to conceive of a community property right and to
take politics into their own hands democratically so
that they themselves come to their own understanding of
what the Constitution protects and promotes. He is
tapping the American legal culture to transform it, not
simply to add one more right to individuals' legal or
constitutional arsenals.
91 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdowns
,
p. 188.
B2 See Staunton Lynd, The Fight Against Shutdowns ,
p. 189.
The political practices explored in this chapter
generated a new conception of a constitutional right
and posited a new arena for an old legal struggle -
the community instead of the courtroom, unlike
traditional political rights struggles, the community
property right movement does not look to the Supreme
Court for affirmation of its claim or characterize
policy problems in simple "rights and remedies-
fashion. Consequently, while the movement is a
politics of rights, it is not rooted in the legal
ideology that fosters the myth of rights. The movement
is predicated on replacing the present culture of
individual competition and reward with a more communal
social order using the tactics of grassroots democratic
action educating the public on the issues and building
consensus around shared values. The community property
movement has conceived of a redistr ibut i ve role for
litigation through the community's power of eminent
domain and has thereby expanded the possibility that a
politics of rights can be an agent of change.
CHAPTER 4.
CONGRESS ON THE CONSTITUTION-
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FIRMS FOR ' THE
HOUSE AND SENATE
A significant part of Congress* constitutional
interpretive practice comes from the important but
little known offices of legal counsel that Congress
established in the last decade to defend and protect
its institutional interests before the Supreme Court.
These offices operate as Congress' "constitutional law
firms." They are the Office of the Senate Legal
Counsel and the Office of the Counsel to the Clerk.
These offices are small with only one client, but that
client is the Congress of the United States.
Intr oduct i on
The work of these law offices and its relationship
to how Congress handles constitutional questions came
to my attention as part of the answer to a question
U.S. Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva raised in a 1983
North Carolina Law Review ^rtirlp in which he asked:
"How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the
Constitution?" 1 This question must be posed against a
prior question, however. How does Congress support and
defend the Constitution? Certainly, as a legislature,
1 See Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?" The North
Carolina Law Review 61 (1983):587.
it does this differently from a court and the activity
may not present itself directly as constitutional
interpretive practice. Therefore „e should understand
Congress' view of the Constitution not just by what it
says about the document but also by what actions
Congress takes - actions it believes to be
constitutional
.
Congress can pursue constitutional meaning down
four main avenues. its influence is felt when it
approves court appointments. it can respond to Court
interpretations by rewriting statutes weaving around
specific Court objections and it frequently does this.
For example, Congress passed the Keating-Owen Act in
1916 which was to protect child labor but the Court
declared it unconstitutional in Hammer v. nat7 . n hfl rt 2
Between 1918 and 1938, Congress made various attempts
at protective labor legislation. Finally in 1938,
Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act which was
a comprehensive protective labor law including
protection for child labor. Subsequently, the Court
upheld this legislation in United States v. Darbv . 3
More recently, Congress has thwarted, in part, Roe v.
2 247 U.S. 251 (1918) .
3 312 U.S. 100 (1941) .
l.g.Hzl„g abortion by pa3slng the comy
"lied "„yde Anient" which prohibits medl cald
funding for abortions.
Congress can also initiate constitutional
amendments to overturn Court decisions. This is, of
course, the roughest and least traveled path.- or
Congress can show its differences with Court judgments
by attempting to remove certain subject areas from the
Court's jurisdiction with what are commonly called
"court-curbing" bills. The one court-curbing bill ever
passed by Congress was in the Reconstruction period.
As part of the Reconstruction Acts, Congress enacted
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. The intent of the law
was to prevent the harassment of freed slaves but its
first use was by William H. McCardle, a racist editor
of the Vicksburg (Mississippi) Times who had been
arrested by the military for publishing an article
critical of Reconstruction. McCardle lost the case and
appealed to the Supreme Court. in order to forestall
the Court's ruling in this case, Congress enacted
legislation in 1868 which repealed the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
D The Eleventh Amendment was passed to overturnChlsholm v. GPnrgjfl
f i Dallas 419 (1793). TheSixteenth Amendment was passed to overturn Pollock v
rFarmers' Loan and Trust Cn.
r 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 . « while this is the only
time Congress has actually changed the Court's
jurisdiction, even its possibility rouses immediate
dire warnings from the scholarly community where there
is no consensus as to whether or not these bills are
constitutional
.
7
A fifth avenue has opened up in the last decade
that does not have some of the political and
institutional problems of the other three - the use of
Congress' constitutional law offices to cull and
articulate Congress' constitutional thought. These
offices were established in response to a change over
time in the Executive's interpretation of the
Faithfully Execute Clause. Beginning in 1926,
presidents have declined to defend acts of Congress
before the Supreme Court in some cases.' More
recently, President Jimmy Carter's attorney general
declined in 1980 to defend the constitutionality of the
Public Broadcasting Corporation Act but upon change of
administrations, Ronald Reagan's attorney general
" See Sheldon Goldman, Constituti onal Law: r.**^
and Essays (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).
7 See Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," Stanford Law Review 36
(1984) :895.
' See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
and Humphrey's Execut or v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) .
93
decided to defend the act. While every act of Congress
must be defended before the Court, it is no longer
always the case that it is the Solicitor General who
does so. Now Congress has its own lawyers who are
accountable directly to, and only to, Congress. And,
unlike the Solicitor General, their loyalty is not
divided between two branches.
Both court-curbing bills and the work of these law
offices enable Congress to directly influence
constitutional interpretation. Court-curbing
legislation, however, does so negatively. By simply
silencing the Court, it would leave us with neither
Court nor Congressional constitutional reasoning.
Through its constitutional law offices Congress can,
instead, focus its own constitutional thought and then
join the debate.
The threat of court-curbing legislation prompted
U.S. Circuit Judge and former Congressman Abner J.
Mikva to assert some years ago that Congress was
incapable of adequately interpreting the Constitution
for itself. Mikva argued that far from being curbed,
the Supreme Court should have the final say. 9 He was
quickly joined in this debate by Congressional
Research Service Specialist Louis Fisher who made the
* See Abner M . Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?," p. 611.
case for both a capacity and an interest in
constitute interpretation by Congress. P i 3her
believes that constitutional interpretation is
misunderstood when framed in terms o £ »f lnal say„ and
should, instead, be understood as a matter o£
"participating in a dialogue" on the Constitution."
This dialogue should not be understood as only between
the court and Congress, however. There is dialogue
within congress on the Constitution which the law
offices cull. It is this discussion that is captured
in the briefs.
In this chapter I explore these two most direct
and deliberate mechanisms for congressional influence
on constitutional meaning, court-curbing legislation
and the work of Congress' constitutional law offices.
I argue that Congress would fail to fulfill its
constitutional role were it simply to defer to the
Court without considering for itself the
constitutionality of its acts. While I believe that
court-curbing legislation is constitutional, I agree
with its critics that its use is dysfunctional for the
constitutional system since it squelches rather than
fosters discourse. Consequently, Congress'
constitutional law offices offer the more viable
10 Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by
U985W07
C°ngreSS '" North Carolina Law RpvIpw ^
mechanism through which Congress can fulfil! its
mission as a co-egual voice of the Constitution.
Court Cnrhinn L P g i ^ i ^ ^ n
There has yet to be a consensus on the extent of
Congress- power to change or remove federal judicial
review authority and while only once in the nation-*
history has Congress succeeded in passing a court-
curbing bill, court-curbing bills should be understood
as part of Congress' constitutional interpretative
practice. Arguably, they have an influence on the
Court even without their passage.- These bills
surface in Congress at moments of greatest
dissatisfaction with specific court decisions. The
Butler-Jenner Bill" of 1958, for example, was an
attempt to remove from federal appellate authority
cases concerning five subject areas in which the Court
had recently handed down controversial decisions. Were
this bill passed, it would have deprived the Court of
appellate jurisdiction in all cases of: contempt
X X See generally Gerald Gunther, "CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: AnOpinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate." See alsoLeslie Friedman Goldstein, "The ERA and the U.S.Supreme Court," Research i n Law and Policy Stndi^
r
l
12 S. 2646, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
proceedings against witnesses before congressional
committees, dismissal of government employees on
security grounds, state laws for the control of
subversive activities, regulations relating to
subversive activities of public school teachers, and
state requirements for admission to the practice of
law. The bill did not pass and was attacked as an
unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power. its
critics argued that since it precluded Supreme Court
review in every case involving a particular subject, it
was an unconstitutional encroachment on the Court's
essential functions.
Court-curbing bills entered a period of quiescence
until the first Reagan Administration. Again, in
response to specific Court judgments, members of
Congress submitted over thirty jurisdiction-stripping
bills. Dissatisfaction stemmed mainly from Court
decisions dealing with the controversial issues of
school prayer, abortion and busing. 13
Congress' power to determine the appellate
authority of the federal courts is established in
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution. The
Constitution gives the Court appellate jurisdiction
"with such exceptions, and under such Regulations as
13 See Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," p. 895.
Congress shall make- over all cases within the judicial
power of the United states originating in state or
lower federal courts. what this means in regard to
Congress- power and, further, what it would mean for
the constitutional system were the power exercised,
have been the subjects of much scholarly debate in the
last thirty years.
In 1960, Leonard G. Ratner argued Congress does
not have the power to withdraw jurisdiction in
specified subject areas. This, according to him, would
encroach on "essential functions" of the Supreme Court.
Ratner defined the "essential functions" of the Court
as providing a uniform and consistent national law. in
Ratner's estimate, an interpretation of Article III,
Section 2 that gave Congress plenary control over the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would mean
that "[it] can all but destroy the coordinate judicial
branch and thus upset the delicately poised
constitutional system of checks and balances." 14
Ratner is not alone in his fears for the
constitutional system were Congress to have authority
over the Court such that it or others by default became
the ultimate authority on the Constitution. This is
what Mikva fears. But Ratner's "essential functions"
14 See Leonard G. Ratner, "Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,"
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 109 (1960):158.
argument has failed to persuade recent scholars.
Martin H. Redish rejects the "essential functions"
argument and looks instead to the Fourteenth Amendment
for a constitutional limit on Congress' power. Redish
argues, "...Congress cannot employ its article III
powers to regulate federal jurisdiction in a manner
that violates another constitutional provision, and ...
[since] the due process clause requires the
availability of a forum that is formally independent of
the body alleged to have violated constitutional
rights...," state supreme courts would be unavailable
in some cases and thus the Supreme Court is needed for
appellate review. « This argument is a variation on
that of Lawrence Sager who argues that there are limits
on Congress' Article III powers because there must be a
f ederal forum for constitutional claims. Like Ratner,
these scholars are struggling to locate the
constitutional bar to Congress' removing Supreme Court
jurisdiction in specified cases.
The reason no one has found a satisfactory
argument against Congress' plenary control in this area
may be because the Constitution does in fact give this
wide discretionary power to Congress. This is Gerald
XB See Martin H. Redish, "Constitutional
Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal
Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager,"
Northwestern University Law Review 77 (1982):163.
Gunther's reading of Article in. Gunther u quifce a
bit more sanguine than Ratner and Mikva about what this
means for the system as a whole. He, li ke they,
believes Congress .J^^ exercise tMs^ ^ ^
takes comfort in the fact that only once has it done
so. Gunther, however, recalls the debates in the
Constitutional Convention that culminated in the
compromise that Article in expresses- and notes that
the early thought was to depend upon state courts for
the adjudication of constitutional claims. Further,
the Framers, according to Gunther, believed Congress
should make the determinations as to when a state
rather than a federal court should answer
constitutional questions.
In a real sense then, Congress's judgment, perhaps
coming through the back door of a state court, was
meant to supercede that of the Supreme Court in some
constitutional areas, in fact, in all areas not
falling within the Court's original jurisdiction. This
view has its supporters and they include the Supreme
Court. 17 what is, of course, most notable about this
view is that it is Congress which has been most
unwilling to exercise the power. When presented with
100
X 6 See Gerald Gunther, "Congressional Power to
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate," p. 912.
17 See Ex Parte McCardle
r
7 Wallace 506 (1869).
court-curbing bllls
, Congress has ^ ^^
as the ulUn.ate constitutional authority. Ftom Ratner
to Gunther to Mikva, the consensus is that this is as
it should be. Mikva. s arguments< howevec<
constitutional ones. Rather, they are o £ the most
practical kind, congress, says Mikva, Just is not good
at interpreting the Constitution.
Mikva v Pich. r
Abner J. Mikva, as a sitting federal judge and
former u.S congressman from Illinois, is in a position
to speak to both constitutional interpretation and
congress' capacity for it. Mikva's judgment is that
"[for] the most part, legislative debate does not
explore the constitutional implications of pending
legislation; and, at best, Congress does an uneven job
of considering the constitutionality of the statutes it
adopts."" Consequently, Mikva suggests that Congress
uphold its oath of office and filter out the clearly
unconstitutional but "the courts should examine to the
fullest extent the constitutional implications of every
piece of legislation."" Mikva offers this extreme
101
la See Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 587.
19 See Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 590.
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solution to the problem o£ Congress' supposed
incapacity in this area without elaboration. Does he
really mean sysij, plece o£ Ugislation? Is Congress
understanding of constitutionality so little to be
depended upon? On the basis of his experience,
apparently epitomized by the three examples he offers,
Mikva concludes that
Congress.
. .has not been a model of
constitutional decision making.
... Its
Jo "oa t Lu en superficial and, for theself ~serv^g constitutional debate
.....While congressional constitutionaldebate aids the courts by identifying issuesand motivations, it is not a substitute forthejudgment of the courts. The courts must
tht harH 5
a?olitical role and makee d decisions Members of Congressshould strive to be Jefferson's independentguardians but should remember that the system
was designed to give the courts the final
say. 20
Not surprisingly, Fisher does not agree with
Mikva's analysis. He avoids the deeper pitfalls of
Mikva 's argument by reshaping the issue. Mikva
concerns himself with who should have the "final say."
Without defining final, he asserts that the Court
should have it. Fisher, wisely, speaks instead in
terms of "contributions to constitutional meaning" and
participation by Congress in "constitutional
ao See Abner J. Mikva, "How Well Does Congress
Support and Defend the Constitution?", p. 610-11.
dialogue.- He says, .. Despite lnstitutional and
Political notations shared with the President and the
courts,... congress can perform an essential, broad,
and ongoing role in shaping the meaning of the
Constitution .
"
aa
This is not a new role for Congress. Fisher
recalls that historically, both the congress and the
executive has been instrumental in determining
constitutional meaning. Fisher offers a brief but
telling review of the doctrine of "coordinate
construction" to "demonstrate that Congress, by the
very nature of the political system, shares with the
executive and the judiciary the duty of constitutional
interpretation."" Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln all
asserted executive constitutional interpretation power
to some degree. Fisher, looking at the example of the
removal power shows that Congress' interpretations have
greatly shaped the Court's judgment. 2 *
2 1 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," North Caroiin,
Law Review 63 (1985):707. ^
22 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 708.
22 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 710-11.
24 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 716.
Fisher's point is not to set Congress or the
Executive above the Court in constitutional
interpretation but rather to show that
..final" ls not
an operative word in this arena.
••[Comments] by
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Taney, and Frankfurter
demonstrate that the Supreme Court is the
-ultimate
interpreter' only when its decisions have been accepted
as reasonable and persuasive by the people and other
governmental units." 28
One of those governmental units, Congress, for
example, continues to be unpersuaded by the Court's
reasoning on the legislative veto. According to
Fisher, within the first sixteen months following the
Court's decision to strike them down, Congress enacted
eighteen bills incorporating fifty-three legislation
vetoes." it is hard to see finality in this.
Fisher does not look for finality from either the
Court or Congress. He characterizes the issue as
not simply one of measuring the competence ofCongress against an ideal standard, but of
comparing legislative to judicial competence.
Because both branches have their strengths
and their weaknesses, an open dialogue
between Congress and the Courts is a more
fruitful avenue for constitutional
2D See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 740.
a * See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 725.
. 105
l-JSKS'^JSS ceS? b6lieVlng that the
skills."
yu5sess es ertain superior
Reminding us that members of Congress take an
oath of office to defend and support the
Constitution and therefore cannot ignore the
constitutional issue when they legislate, Fisher
defends the authority and competence of Congress
in the realm of Constitutional interpretation. A
particular strength of Congress is fact-finding
and under the doctrine of presumption of
constitutionality,- the Court depends on Congress
for this. "When the judiciary determines that
legislators have chosen a 'rational basis' for
rn ,
27
f
e
f
Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 722Footnote omitted. y
The doctrine of presumption of
constitutionality was respected more in its breach thanin its observance during the Lochner Era, the heyday ofthe Court's use of substantive due process doctrine^Under substantive due process doctrine, the Court waspresuming legislation to be unconstitutional and
requiring that it pass often impossible "constitutionaltests. As the Court's authority began to erodebecause of this activism against New Deal legislation,it took the institutionally protective course ofdeferring to Congress' view of constitutionality by notquestioning legislation except in certain cases. TheCourt continues to apply "strict scrutiny" in cases
where legislation on its face infringes the Bill of
Rights, where the open political processes are impeded
and where legislation affects "discrete and insular
minorities .
"
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carrying out the commerce power, for example, the
Court's investigation ceases.""
Mikva claims the structure of Congress is such
that it cannot make constitutional determinations.
Fisher, however, finds that there are numerous
institutional mechanisms that enable Congress to
participate in constitutional interpretive practice.
He says that
Congressional hearings attract testimony fromadministration witnesses, constitutional
scholars, and representatives of variousprivate organizations. Committee staff cananalyze constitutional questions and call onthe American Law Division of the Library ofCongress which is staffed with approximatelyfifty attorneys specializing in different
subject areas. The office of the LegislativeCounsel of the House and the Office of theLegislative Counsel of the Senate,
established to assist members in draftingbills and resolutions, also provide
constitutional advice. 30
Members of Congress do not stop at Congress'
doors, however, when it comes to pushing their views of
constitutionality. Fisher calls it a "striking
development" that over the past decade more and more
members have turned to the courts for assistance. 31
29 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 730.
30 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p.
730
.
31 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 731.
These cases carry with them political questions and
standing to sue problems, however. Legislators must
meet all the standing requirements of any other
litigant but also must show that they do not suffer
from an injury that can be "redressed by their
colleagues acting through the regular legislative
process
. . . .
The political question and standing to sue problem
does not enter another whole group of cases, however.
Because these are those in which Congress as an
institution pursues a case to the Supreme Court.
Congress- interest in any case that questions the
constitutionality of its legislation is clear, it
always has standing to sue." since the whole Congress
and not just members of it are bringing suit, the
redress to colleagues problem is resolved and only
constitutional questions remain in these cases. In
these instances, Congress calls in its own
constitutional law offices.
33 See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress," p. 730-31.
33 See R. Lawrence Dessem, "Congressional Standing
to Sue: Whose Vote is This, Anyway?" Notre Dame Law
Review 62 ( 1986) :1.
Traditionally, the Justice Department has been
Congress- constitutional law firm
. It was the jofa Qf
the Solicitor General to defend the constitutionality
of legislation before the Supreme Court. This practice
began to change when the executive in 1926 asserted
that there are two circumstances under which the
Attorney General can decline to defend a statute. m
one case the President is not required to defend
statutes that, in his opinion, unconstitutionally
encroach on the authority or powers of the president.
In the other case, the president is not required to
defend statutes that are clearly unconstitutional. The
case law undergirding these assertions is Myers v.
United States and Humphrey'* Exsrnhnr v. UnitpH
States
.
3
* i n Myers
, the power of the President to
remove subordinates without interference was at issue.
Here the Solicitor General argued for the first time
that an act of Congress was unconstitutional. The
Court agreed that the act in question improperly eroded
the President's authority. In Humphrey's Executor, the
Solicitor General argued that the Federal Trade
Commission Act was unconstitutional if construed to
limit the President's removal power. The Court
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3 « 272 U.S. 52 (1926) and 295 U.S. 602 (1935)
respectively.
disagreed and held the act's restriction was
permissible. >» it was this changed practice of the
Solicitor General of sometimes attacking rather than
automatically defending federal statutes that prompted
Congress to establish its own constitutional law
offices in 1978. Why Congress waited so long is an
open question.
The issues that the executive has chosen to attack
rather than defend have been anything but trivial. In
INS Y
t CHAPHft ,
36 the legislative veto was attacked. In
this case, the Court declared the legislative veto
unconstitutional. The legislative veto was constructed
fifty years ago as an administrative efficiency measure
to expedite New Deal legislation in response to the
Depression. It gave some "quasi-legislative" power to
the executive but retained an ultimate one or two-
house veto over decisions made thereunder.
In the last decade, Congress has concluded that it
is essential that it have its own legal counsel to see
3 B See Editors Notes, "Equitable Discretion and
the Congressional Defense of Statutes," Yale Law
Journal 92 (1983) :970.
3 * INS v. Chariha. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In this
case, the Court declared the legislative veto
unconstitutional. The legislative veto was constructed
fifty years ago as an administrative efficiency measure
to expedite New Deal legislation in response to the
Depression. It gave some "quasi-legislative" power to
the executive but retained an ultimate one or two-house
veto over decisions made thereunder.
to xt that its statute, are always vigorously defended
before the Court. Sur Prislngly uttle 3cholarly
attention has been focused on this change in the
relationship between the executive and legislative
departments nor the subsequent use of the congressional
law offices to correct the imbalance." Even wlthln
Congress, only recently have members learned of the
existence of the offices and understood their
responsibilities, since part of the law offices'
responsibilities is defending members with legal
problems, the members often hear about the law offices
the hard way, however. 38
The two offices, while having virtually the same
structure and responsibilities, blossomed from
different seeds. The Office of the Senate Legal
Counsel was statutorily created by the "Ethics in
37 See generally Louis Fisher, "Constitutionalinterpretation by Members of Congress , "R. Lawrence
^hir'Anv^^r^ 0^ 1 Standing t0 Su- Whose "2e is
Ini fh^r Editors Notes, "Equitable Discretiona d t e Congressional Defense of Statutes."
_ *V nter y iew with Michael Travaglini of the Officeof the Counsel to the Clerk on August 8, 1988 Iconducted telephone interviews on April 19 and 20 andAugust 3 and 8, 1988 with members of both the House and
fh2
a
nL° !S : Mor 9an Rankle, Assistant Counsel, ofthe Office of the Senate Legal Counsel and MichaelTravaglini were especially generous with their time andhelp. They both provided briefs, answered questionsthemselves and sought answers from others where
necessary to provide the history and current picture ofthese two offices.
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Government Act o£ 1978" " At this same time, there
«as a bill to create a joint House-Senate Office of
congressional Legal Counsel but the appropriate House
committees did not consider the bill. Because the
House was not prepared to agree to the creation of the
Joint office, the bill was later amended to create only
the Office of senate Legal Counsel.- The Office of
the counsel to the Clerk which performs the same duties
for the House has evolved over the past decade through
a series of personnel decisions .
^
The Office of the Senate Legal Counsel acts in the
Senate's name only when directed to do so by a
resolution of the Senate and consequently is clearly
the voice of the Senate when it argues before the
Supreme Court. The office is directly accountable to
the Joint Leadership Group which consists of the
President pro tempore of the Senate, majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, chair and ranking
minority members on the Committee of the Judiciary of
the Senate and the chair and ranking minority member of
111
3 9 II iEthics in Government Act of 1978" - Public Law95-521 CS. 555]; October 26, 1978. The Office of theSenate Legal Counsel was codified at 2 U.S.C. Sect. 288(19 8 2) .
*° See Footnote 3 in Editor's notes Yale Law
Journal p. 973.
41 Interview with Michael Travaglini April 19,
1988.
the committee of the Senate which has Jurisdiction over
the contingency funds of the Senate.
The chartering statute for the office requires
that,
-tin] performing any function under this chapter,
the Counsel shall defend vigorously..." the
constitutionality of acts of Congress.- Unlike tne
other sections of this law, Congress here uses the
words "shall defend vigorously" in relation to the
defense of the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
It is clear that Congress was determined to have in
Place its own effective mechanism for its participation
in constitutional debate with the Supreme Court.
The Office of the Senate Legal Counsel consists of
the Counsel, a Deputy Counsel and Assistant Counsels.
The position of Counsel has been filled by only one
person in its brief history. This Counsel came to the
office from tours as the Chief staff Attorney for the
D.C. Circuit and as counsel to the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund. There have been three deputy counsels - one from
Capitol Hill, one from an executive agency and one from
a trade association and work on Capital Hill, one of
the current two assistant counsels was a judicial
clerk. Others have come from the Department of Justice
and private practice. An assistant counsel commented,
however, that while only two have come from private
* a 2 U.S.C. Sect. 288 (1982) at 584.
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Practice, they all could have because the work is
essentially that of a private law firm.-
Because this office speaks for the Congress as a
whole when it defends the constitutionality of
legislation, it does not make recommendations about
legislation. As noted earlier, there are numerous
attorneys available to Congress for that purpose. The
appointments to the office are nonpolitical as well.
The Counsel and Deputy Counsel are appointed by the
president pro tempore of the senate from among
recommendations submitted by the senate majority and
minority leaders. The law commands that the
appointments be made solely on the basis of merit."
The Counsel and Deputy Counsel are appointed for a term
that expires at the end of the congress within which
they are appointed but they may be reappointed. Since
there has been only one Counsel in the life of the
office and the senate has been in the hands of both the
Democrats and the Republicans in that time, it is fair
to say the nonpartisan nature of the office has been
respected
.
Because the Counsel to the Clerk has been
established by a series of decisions made by the Bi-
partisan Group of the House rather than by statute, the
43 Interview with Morgan Frankle August 3, 1988.
2 U.S.C. Sect. 288 (1982) at 575.
office has slightly l ess official standing. its
history and the background of its Counsel, Deputies and
Assistants parallels that of its senate counterpart,
however. There have been two Counsels to the Clerk in
its short life but the current Counsel has held the
position almost since the inception of the office and
rose to the post from the position of Deputy Counsel.
The current House Counsel came to the office from other
work on Capitol Hill. The Deputy Counsel had three
years experience as an assistant Senate Legal Counsel
before joining the House office. There are two
Assistant House Counsels whose backgrounds vary between
experience at the Justice Department and as clerks for
the D.C. Circuit. (Interestingly, one of the
clerkships was with Abner J. Mikva.) The House office
also has a law clerk who began in the office as a
paralegal before entering law school. The work and the
structure of the office is that of most law firms. The
difference is that the sole client of these offices is
the Congress of the United States.
This client has recently employed these two
offices to defend challenged legislation before the
Supreme Court in three landmark cases: INS V.
CHAPHA,« S BOWSHER V. SYNAR
r
* 8 and MORRISON V. OLSON ""*
+ a 462 U.S. 919 (1983) .
4 « 106 S.Ct. 3181 ( 1986) .
" the legislative veto, the balanced budget bill and
the independent counsel cases respectively. m
B °WShfir
'
ReP"sentative Michael Synar of Oklahoma
challenged the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 immediately
upon its passage. The act called for an automatic
budget-cutting scheme that would be administered by the
Comptroller General. Synar charged that because the
Comptroller General is ultimately removable by
Congress, he/she could not play what amounts to an
executive agency role since it would breech separation
of powers principles. in M^rJ^a, the establishment
of the Office of Independent Counsel was challenged.
The felt need for the independence of these counsels
arose in the aftermath of Watergate. The special
prosecutor in that case, Archibald Cox, was appointed
by the Attorney General and therefore accountable to
him. Ultimately, Cox was not fully free to carry his
investigation as far as he felt it should go and was
fired. The independence of his successor was
guaranteed only by the word of the President. Congress
established in this act a statutory foundation for the
independence of independent counsels.
Are these laws constitutional? Congress says yes.
The legal briefs in these three cases provide the
108 S. Ct. 2597 (1987).
record of Congress- interpretation of the Constitution
with regard to separation of powers and delegation of
authority doctrines, the Appointments Clause, The
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Faithfully Execute
Clause. The Supreme Court has agreed only once with
Congress' interpretation in these cases, but that is
not what is noteworthy here. Our attention should be
on these briefs as the outcome of Congress-
participation in Fisher's "constitutional dialogue." I
turn now to Congress- discourse on the Constitution
revealed in these three cases.
Congressional Con stitutional Discourse
CHADHA presented the first constitutional case of
major proportions presented to the House and Senate law
offices. Like the instances cited above, this was
another case of refusal by the Attorney General to
defend the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
The case, ostensibly about the fate of a deportable
alien, more importantly questioned the
constitutionality of the legislative veto. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice White called the case one
of "surpassing importance" because declaring the
legislative veto unconstitutional "sounds the death
knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions In
which Congress has reserved a "legislative veto-.""
Clearly, a very important case to be handed to two
small law offices. The House Counsel did in this case
employ an additional attorney in the person of Eugene
Gressman of the University of North Carolina School of
Law but the Office of Senate Legal Counsel handled its
brief entirely in office, when it came time for oral
argument before the Supreme Court, the Senate Legal
Counsel, Michael Davidson, took the entire time for
both offices since the statutory basis of the Senate
office was felt to give more authority to his position.
This practice was also followed for the same reason in
the case of the independent counsel, MorrMnn y n } ~ n
discussed subsequently
.
The Senate Legal Counsel and the Counsel to the
Clerk comprise the voice of the Congress before the
Supreme Court. When a case is underway on the Senate
side, members of the Joint Leadership Group are kept
apprised of the arguments and have opportunity for
input into them although the greatest contribution is
4 a INS V, Chfld.ha., 462 U.S. 919 (1983) at 967.
*• Asked if there is any thought in the House of
giving statutory authority to the Counsel to the Clerk
as the House's voice at the Supreme Court, Michael
Travaglini responded that the Bi-Partisan Group is
satisfied with the current status and process.
Interview August 8, 1988.
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-de by the attorneys in the office." On the House
side, weekly meetings occur to keep the Bi-Partisan
Group informed and in a position to give input as well,
in some cases (most recently the independent counsel
case), members of the minority party will withdraw
support for a posited legal argument and ask that their
names be removed from the brief if the argument is
pursued.- However, it is still fair to say that these
briefs represent Congress- interpretation of the
Constitution in the same sense that non-unanimous
legislation is Congress- policy choice.
Congress' interpretation of its powers under the
Necessary and Proper Clause and its interpretation of
the separation of powers and delegation of authority
doctrines are in the House and Senate party briefs
filed in CJiMHA. At issue in this case is the question
as to whether the legislative veto is a constitutional
means of implementing the power of Congress over the
admission of aliens. Both the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and Jagdish Rai Chadha, the
deportable alien, argued that this use of the
legislative veto unconstitutionally infringed the
so Interview with Morgan Frankle, August 3, 1987.
sx In the independent counsel case, The Speaker
and Leadership Group consisted of The Honorable Jim
Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives; The
Honorable Thomas S. Foley, Majority Leader; and The
Honorable Tony Coelho, Majority Whip.
constitutional powers of the executive. Section 244 of
the immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 provides
for a sharing of some of the authority over deportable
aliens but ultimate authority stays in Congress. Does
the Constitution allow this? Congress says yes.
In its senate brief, Congress argues that the
Presentation and Bicameralism Clauses do not apply ln
this case because they are fully satisfied by the
underlying statute authorizing legislative review."
Congress strongly objected to the Supreme Court's
considering the constitutionality of a "generic"
legislative veto and urged that the Court limit its
opinion to the use of the legislative veto in the
circumstances of the instant case. Consequently, the
Senate brief concentrates its argument on the
constitutionality of the legislative veto in regard to
deportable aliens only. Calling on precedent, the
brief argues that the legislative veto should be judged
by the test set out in Nixon v. Admi n i *hr^n r o f
general Service* 3 and that the legislative veto used
a 2 INS V. Ghfltihfl/ Docket No. 80-1832, Brief of the
United States Senate, Appellee-Petitioner, p. 33.
03 Nixon V, Administrator of General ServirP*
r
433
U.S. 425 (1977). "[The] proper inquiry focuses on the
extent to which [the act] prevents the Executive Branch
from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions [and if it does] whether that impact isjustified by an overriding need to promote objectives
within the constitutional authority of Congress."
Nixon at 443.
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here passes that test. "it augments, and in no manner
infringes upon, executive power.— Tne Senate Legal
Counsel leaves to the Counsel to the Clerk the
constitutional arguments regarding separation of powers
and delegation of authority doctrines generally. The
Senate joins the House brief by its endorsement of it.
While the House Office of Counsel to the Clerk
does not have statutory foundation, its intervention in
Qh&lhsL was agreed to unanimously by House resolution."
In its brief, the House Counsel fleshed out Congress'
interpretation of separation of powers doctrine.
Congress argues that
[The] Constitution does not say that thethree great functions shall at all times bekept separate and independent of each other,
or that the three functions can never beblended or mixed or delegated as among thethree Branches. The notion of total
separation of the powers % central or
essential' to the operation of the three
great departments is an illogical and
impractical formulation of the separation
doctrine, not a constitutional command. Bs
Not only does Congress say it is not unconstitutional
for there to be some "mixing and blending," it asserts
there is a positive good in this. The concept of separation
a + See Senate Brief, p. 28.
SB See Brief of the United States House of
Representatives, Appellee-Petitioner, p. Ill of INS v.
CHADHA-
See Senate Brief, p. 22.
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must be the oio^. one which is pragmatic and flexible."
in the court's opinion, Justice White is chided for
replacing efficiency for constitutionalism.- We can see
Congress here constructing the argument that identifies the
efficient or pragmatic and flexible with the constitutional.
It is a call to an understanding that uses contemporary
usage so that the document "lasts the ages .
"
The House brief offers its own vocabulary of
constitutionalism. it moves from "separation of powers-
language to that of a "blended form of government." And
"[at] the core of this 'blended- form of government is the
legislating body, the Congress of the United States. »»•
Certainly, there remain separate tasks for the three
branches but within those tasks, the Constitution has
authorized Congress, through the Necessary and Proper
Clause* 0 "to blend and mix, in statutory form, the various
powers of government, and to delegate some of its own
legislative functions to Executive officers and agencies .
"
sx
Ultimately, then, Congress is arguing that the separation of
S 7 See Senate Brief, p. 23.
38 INS v. Chadha
r
462 U.S. 919 (1983) at 944-45.
See Senate Brief, p. 24.
so United States Constitution Article I, Sect. 8.,
CI. 18. Congress shall have the power "to make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing powers...."
s:L See Senate Brief, p. 24.
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powers concept must be understood not as dividing
"the
branches into watertight compartments" but rather "to permit
that degree of intergovernmental cooperation considered
'necessary and proper- for effective government .
—
Efficiency is, Congress claims, a constitutional standard.
We can also see in Q^dJia Congress- interpretation of
the Necessary and Proper clause in regard to the delegation
of authority. Here, Congress depends upon John Marshall's
rUle in «gCm i Q*h v ^rvlmn for its understanding of this
clause" and concludes that the delegation of its authority
is an "appropriate means" toward the legitimate end, in this
case, of dealing with deportable aliens. "The short of it
is that Congress may use its 'necessary and proper' powers
so as to delegate to others some, all or none of its plenary
legislative power ...[ and ] it may place conditions and
limitations on any such delegation. ...
Having delegated the power, what happens to it? That
is, has Congress "given it away" such that what was
originally legislative power is now executive power? If
this is the case, then the legislative veto clearly has
separation of powers problems. Congress cannot intervene in
the executive's exercise of its own powers. This according
6 2
fi 3
See Senate Brief, p. 27.
See Senate Brief, p. 36.
e * See Senate Brief, p. 36.
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to Congress is not, however, what happens when congressional
authority is delegated. Congress holds that
nnu ^
necessarily follows that when legislativeS™V f natUre has been delegated to anotherdepartment or executive officer, the power
exercised by the delegatee retains its legislativeor quasi-legislative nature. One who receivessome part of the legislative power through thesweep of the Necessary and Proper Clause does notexercise that power by virtue of the Executivepower to execute the laws of the United States.One exercises quasi-legislative power. ss
On Congress' reading of the delegation authority, therefore,
the power being exercised, by whatever department or agent,
remains a legislative power and therefore Congress is
clearly within its power not only to attach strings but to
pull them as well.
In its briefs, Congress has articulated its own
interpretation of two fundamental constitutional doctrines -
- separation of powers and delegation of authority. While
the briefs, of course, call on past Court opinions, what is
of primary significance is that they also construct their
own theories. Their arguments are based on Congress 1 s
theories of constitutionalism. Congress is arguing here
that constitutional principles be defined in today's terms.
While not repudiating original intent theory, Congress would
qualify it as not apt in those situations that the Framers
could not have conceived. For instance, the situation of a
huge administrative state apparatus that requires power to
" B See Senate Brief, p. 37.
124
run but brakes on that power as well. Congress does not
argue simple expediency. it ties its argument to the
constitutional text and its history. it interprets the
Constitution and bases its actions on that interpretation.
As far as Congress is concerned, the legislative veto is not
simply efficient, it is constitutional. Constitutional in
some measure, however, b^ajise. it is efficient. This would
be part of Congress' constitutional standard.
Looking at the example of Bowsher v. Synfir one could
argue that Congress sees itself as subservient to the Court
on the Constitution. Qhs&hsL, however, is support for
Congress' claim of full competence to read the Constitution
for itself. Here, Congress has articulated its own
interpretation. Even though the Court has not embraced this
interpretation, Congress has continued to use legislative
vetoes. ss Does this mean Congress has the final say? Or,
does this just mean the dialogue is ongoing?
Another example of Congressional constitutional
dialogue with the Supreme Court comes in Morrison v. Olsen.
the independent counsel case. At issue in this case is
whether Congress can require that independent counsels be
appointed by the courts when the Attorney General determines
their need. The mechanism for this appointment comes in the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which establishes the
me See Louis Fisher, "Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress," p. 740.
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office and duties of the independent counsels. it is the
constitutionality of this act that is challenged. Congress
is not a party in this case and therefore filed
briefs. These briefs reveal Congress- interpretation of the
Faithful Execution and Appointments Clauses.
in the brief submitted by the House, Counsel notes that
this act has been re-authorized twice and signed into law
three times by the President. This triple endorsement,
according to Congress, comes from "Congress- careful
consideration of the constitutional issues.— Congress
wants the Court to know that it does not just hope the act
is constitutional, it believes it is. "Based on
overwhelming evidence of both constitutional legitimacy and
suitability of the means to the legislative purpose,
Congress passed the Ethics Act in 1978. "«•
Congress' constitutional arguments, here, therefore,
are neither tentative nor elaborate. Can Congress vest
appointment power in courts of law? Clearly, yes. The
7 Article II, Sect. 1, CI. 8. "Before he enter on the
Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or
Affirmation: -- 'I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I willfaithfully execute the office of President of the United
States •» Article II, Sect. 2, CI. 2. "...Congress may
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments."
* Morrison v. Olson
r Docket No. 87-1279, Brief of the
Speaker and Leadership Group of the House of
Representatives, amici curiae at 12.
See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.
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Constitution says,
"...the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior officers, as they think
Proper... in the Courts of Law...."- shoul(J ^
be read as to be limiting in Congress- authority? Certalniy
not.
"
It strains credulity to suggest that the Pramers
would have chosen that phrase if they meant the Clause to
Place unstated limits on what types of appointment could be
vested [in this alternative ].
In addition to reading the text of the document, the
Senate in its brief returns to the Kramers' debates to
underscore Congress- reading of the Appointments Clause.
Congress would remind the Court that extensive debate took
Place regarding the power of appointment. The extension of
the power of appointment to the courts through the
legislature was a deliberate act that was intended not just
to promote "beneficial appointments" but also to preserve
the balance in government."^ This obviously comports well
with Congress' view of the separation of powers doctrine
discussed earlier. The act looks to the Attorney General to
call for the independent counsel and then looks to the
courts to appoint one who is independent of the branch she
will investigate.
-t o See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.
71 See Brief of the Speaker and Leadership Group of the
House of Representatives, p. 12.
72 See Senate Brief, p. 25.
How independent the counsel is to be raised a further
constitutional question that elicited Congress- reading of
the Faithful Execution Clause. The challengers of the act
claimed that unless the President has full authority over
all in his chain of command, he cannot faithfully execute
his duties. This assertion, says Congress, is based on a
misreading of the Faithful Execution Clause as an expansion
rather than a limitation on executive power. "By its
wording and history, the Faithful Execution Clause exists
primarily to limit Executive power, and not as a basis for
the Executive to have laws struck down." 73 Even so,
Congress is sensitive to the principle that no act of
Congress can infringe on the executive's ability to
accomplish its assigned functions. Therefore, vesting
removal power for good cause in the Attorney General
respects this principle. "Vesting solely that power of
selection in the courts in order to guarantee impartiality
and ensure public confidence in no way "prevents the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally
assigned functions "'7 * Whether or not the Ethics in
Government Act is constitutional is no longer a debatable
issue as far as the Court and Congress are concerned. Both
agree that it is.
73 Morrison v. Olson
, Docket No. 87-1279, Brief of the
United States Senate as amicus curiae at 36.
74 See Brief of the United States Senate as amicus
cur iae
,
p. 46. Footnote omitted.
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both Ch^ and Congress^ ^ ^
own reading of the Constitution to defend the
constitutionality of its act, r„ ^ *us, in CJiadiia, in spite of the
Courts disagreement, Congress continues to believe
legislative vetoes are constitutional and continues to act
°" that m B^H^^s^, rather than cainng ^
the text of the Constitution, Congress' briefs are based
solely on appeals to Supreme Court precedent. Congress
offers no independent constitutional theories here. The
balanced budget statute, itself, was also different from the
other two discussed here. Within the statute was ^
provision that its constitutionality could be immediately
tested in court and that the Supreme Court could not decline
to take the appeal."73
Sowsher and Chadha give mixed signals about Congress'
deference to the Court as the ultimate authority on the
Constitution. I turn now to that issue in the conclusion of
this chapter.
Conclus i on
This chapter argues that Congress can and does
interpret the Constitution for itself. The new articulators
of that interpretation are Congress' constitutional law
offices, the Offices of the Senate Legal Counsel and Counsel
73 Congressional Qua rterly. Inn.
r
February 8, 1986,
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to the Clerk. Congress established these offices to protect
its institutional interests before the Supreme Court but
they serve a broader purpose as well. They provide the one
voice of congress on constitutional interpretation that
Abner Mikva, among others, claims it does not have. Mikva
says Congress cannot interpret the Constitution because its
structure and political interests do not allow this. These
offices, however, do gather the constitutional thoughts of
the Congress and bring them together in one articulate
whole
.
This is not to say that Congress is participating in
interpretation for the first time when the offices do this,
however. Far from it. From the beginning, Congress has
interpreted the Constitution in the performance of its work.
Every act of Congress must be seen as an instance of
Constitutional interpretation. What these offices provide
through their briefs that is new is the record of Congress'
constitutional seasoning. The briefs are the result of the
ongoing process of constitutional interpretation by Congress
that has been mistakenly discounted in the past.
The briefs of the law offices are the voice of
Congress. Just as we can take an opinion of the Supreme
Court and say, this is the Court speaking on the
Constitution, we can take the briefs of the Senate Legal
Counsel and the Counsel to the Clerk and say this is
Congress speaking on the Constitution. Before, it was
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debatable which constitutional theory offered on the floor
of Congress was the constitutional theory behind the
legislation. Now Congress has a mechanism through which to
make clear the constitutional theory that undergirds its
legislation. Were Congress to resort to the use of court-
curbing bills, instead, we would know that Congress had
rejected the Court's reasoning but not what reasoning
Congress would offer instead. Court-curbing bills,
therefore, are a weapon against the Court, but not a
positive contribution to constitutional interpretation.
Congress does, however, make an important positive
contribution through its constitutional law offices.
Walter Murphy recently characterized the debate between
democracy and judicial review as "misguided."'' 8 He said it
was misguided because it looks for a universal answer to who
should be ultimate interpreter. Murphy suggests, instead, a
"modified version of departmentalism." His departmentalism
would
[lower] the stakes by ascribing different
areas of competence - areas whose borders
shift over time. Thus, if widely accepted,
this form of departmentalism would reduce,
though not eliminate, conflict between the
federal judiciary, on the one hand, and
Congress and/or the presidency on the other.
Moreover, by decreasing the scope of judicial
authority to bind other branches of the
federal government, it underlines the value,
7<s See Walter Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret? The Quest
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter." The Review of
Politics 48 (1986) :401-23.
br^Lh
eCT ity/ ° f reason in Persuading otheranc es to accept any particular
constitutional interpretation. 77
This echoes Fisher's "constitutional dialogue" that
calls on all branches to come to their own
constitutional interpretations rather than simply to
defer to the Court.
Congress does this. it is yet unpersuaded by the
reasoning of the Court on the legislative veto, for
example, and chooses not to defer to the judiciary
there. Congress claims this as one of its "areas of
competence, •• but it is apparently less sure of its own
reasoning on the balanced budget act and is open to the
reasoning of the Court there. On the other hand,
Congress is most confident that it knows what the
Constitution means in the Appointments Clause and
confidently shares its thinking with the Court there.
Fisher's model of constitutional interpretation as
dialogue and Murphy's of a modified departmentalism
help explain the role of Congress which has been
institutionalized by the law firms. Congress, through
its constitutional law offices, appears to have put
these theories to work.
7,7 See Walter Murphy, "Who Shall Interpret? The
Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter,"
p. 417.
CHAPTER 5.
TESTTMnMv
T
^2NY T ° INSTITUTIONAL FAITH-I ONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTELECTIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Connecticut is the "Constitution State." it
claims to have written the first American charter of
government
- The Fundamental Orders - long before the
colonies ever conceived of themselves as states. So
precious was this charter to Connecticut colonists that
they risked their lives to protect it from royal
revocation. when King Charles II of England decided to
revoke The Fundamental Orders, the most liberal charter
of all the colonies, he sent his royal governor, Sir
Edmund Andross, to retrieve the document. Sir Edmund
was received with great ceremony by the citizens of
Connecticut on the night of his arrival. Seated at a
table, the charter was placed before him. Almost
immediately, all the candles in the room were blown
out. When they were re-lighted, the charter was no
where to be found -- and continued to be hidden from
the king ever after. People in Connecticut take
constitutions very seriously. 1
1 Per interview with staff reference librarian of
the Connecticut Historical Society on April 26, 1990.
Introduction
When, in 1985, Connecticut was called upon to be
the 33rd (or 34th and deciding) state to jo in the call
for a second Constitutional Convention, the Committee
on Government Administration and Elections (CAE) of the
General Assembly held hearings at three locations in
the state to elicit the thoughts of its citizens.
While hearings themselves are not unusual in
Connecticut, multiple hearings on one issue, as well as
holding hearings outside the capital of Hartford, are.
The number and political mix of speakers on both sides
were unusual as well. They ran the gamut from Thomas
I. Emerson, Lines Professor of Constitutional Law
Emeritus at Yale University to the state's senators to
heads of interest groups to a naturalized citizen who,
in broken English, expressed a strong personal sense of
the Constitution. There were liberals and
conservatives on both sides of the issue. 2
2 Betty Tianti who is Secretary Treasurer of the
state AFL-CIO said, "I would say when you get people,
when you get organizations such as the Business
Roundtable and the AFL-CIO, former Defense Secretary
Laird, Roy Ash, many conservatives who have joined with
the liberal progressives, if you will, then I think we
have a good position." See the Record of the Testimony
Before the Government Administration and Elections
Committee, The Joint Standing Committee of the
Connecticut General Assembly. March 18, 1985, p. 605.
The following references to this testimony will be
referred to as GAE Testimony, date and page only.
The call for a second constitutional convention
grew out of a desire of some to amend the Constitution
to require a balanced budget. Since the Senate had
failed to propose this amendment, its supporters were
left with the larger task of getting 34 states to agree
to consider the idea in a constitutional convention.
Consequently, the debate over a balanced budget
amendment expanded to the larger issue of a convention
with all the attendant uncertainty of whether
amendments would be limited to balancing the budget.
Anxiety over a second constitutional convention that
might do as the first and throw out the operating rules
of government lead most who testified in Connecticut to
ignore the issue of balancing the budget and instead to
fight the idea of reconsidering the Constitution.
The testimony against the convention call far
outweighed that in favor of it. Both sides had well
organized coalitions, however. Most of those in
support spoke to the economics of a balanced budget
amendment while those opposed concentrated on the
Constitution itself. It is this latter testimony that
reveals the intense visceral attachment to the document
that speaker after speaker referred to as "sacred." A
remarkable depth of feeling is captured in the
testimony before the General Assembly committee. This
testimony epitomizes what Sotirios Barber calls
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"constitution Handedness" and what Louis Flsher and
Walter Murphy call for as an essentlal ^ ^ ^
whole practice of Constitutional interpretation, it is
the kind of political activity John Brigham points to
« popular interpretive practice. The frequent use of
the religious metaphor in the testimony also draws this
activity into the orbit of Sanford Levinson who speaks
of "constitutional faith." 3
There is little evidence other than Fourth of July
celebrations of popular American interest in and
commitment to the Constitution, it is usually as taken
for granted and ignored as it is cherished. Were one
to try to measure the "constitution mindedness" or
"constitutional faith" of the American people, as
opposed to the courts with their written opinions, one
would be hard pressed to locate the evidence. Perhaps,
this is the reason political scientists have been
remiss in documenting these politics and understanding
them as constitutional interpretive practice.
Consequently, this testimony before the committee of
M-«n/ fnfTf 0^ 103 5afbef' Qn Wnflt Constitutionnsflns
,
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1984); Louis Fisher, Constitutional di a lnm,P*
r(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988); Walter Murphy, "Who shall Interpret? The Quest
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter," The
Review pf Politics 48 (1985) :401-23; John Brigham, The
Cult of the Court (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1987); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1988).
the Connecticut General Assembly offers a rare
opportunity to hear Americans, most of whom disclaim
any special competence in interpretation, explain what
£HfiX think the Constitution means.
Testimony, under oath or otherwise, provides a
special documentation of what people believe. L.H.
LaRue recently explored the testimony before the United
States House Judiciary Committee considering the
impeachment of Richard M
. Nixon during the Watergate
affair. He turned to this testimony as evidence of how
we understand ourselves as a people. Politicians,
reasons LaRue, are experts in knowing what can be said
publicly and thus he looked at the House Judiciary
Committee's testimony for judgments about who we are as
a people. In the same way, the testimony in
Connecticut also gives us insight into, in LaRue 's
words, "our character and our aspirations." 4 in a vein
similar to LaRue's, I look at the text of the testimony
before a committee of the Connecticut General Assembly
to take account of popular political discourse
surrounding the Constitution. This testimony, given in
Connecticut but drawn from national leaders, gives us
insight into popular attitudes toward the Constitution.
While sometimes attitudes toward the law have little
4 See L.H. LaRue, Political Discourse: A Case
Study of the Watergate Affair (Athens, Georgia:
University of Georgia Press, 1988).
affect on how the law is handled by those in charge of
it,- in this case, popular attitudes are determinative.
The attitude of most of those testifying in Connecticut
is "hands off the Constitution." This attitude
prevailed. While this chapter is not concerned with
the ramifications of that perspective, it certainly
raises questions for democratic theorists.
The issue of a constitutional convention brought
out more who have a deep "constitutional faith" than
those who are committed to a specific economic theory.
"Constitutional faith," a term coined by Sanford
Levinson in his book of the same name, is,
"wholehearted attachment to the Constitution as the
center of one's (and ultimately the nation's) political
life."« Levinson wonders who, when confronted with an
opportunity to affirm a commitment to the Constitution
actually takes the oath seriously. When we raise our
hand in affirmation in order to get a passport, for
example, are we thinking of the Constitution or of the
new horizons to which the passport is the ticket?
See John Brigham, "Bad Attitudes: Survey
Research, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Practice."
Paper presented to panels on "Public Discourse and Law:
the Role of the Citizen," Midwest Political Science
Association, April 13-15, 1989; and "Legal Culture and
Legal Claims," Law and Society Meetings, Madison,
Wisconsin, June 8-11, 1989.
• See Sanford Levinson, Constitut ional Faith
r
p. 4
.
implicitly, Levinson assumes the latter. Consequently,
he encourages a constitutional
"conversation" within
the American polity that would take more seriously the
implications of the oath as well as the document
itself. Levinson would, no doubt, be encouraged by the
number of people in Connecticut who already take that
document very seriously. He might, however, be
troubled by the obvious reluctance of those same people
to "risk" a formal conversation on it. People in
Connecticut came out on three occasions and at times
stayed all day and far into the night to have the
opportunity to give testimony on the call for a
constitutional convention. They "feared." They
"trembled." They came to "protect" the Constitution.
The irony, however, is that they came to protect it
from the people.
The testimony in Connecticut mirrors the tensions
the written document produced at its birth. James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson squared off on the issue
of reverence for the Constitution as the ink was drying
and came down on different sides. Madison, spurred by
concerns for stability, urged a respect for the
Constitution that would evince itself in a diffidence
toward the document that eschewed change. 7 Jefferson
would love the document by having each generation make
7 See Federalist 49.
it peculiarly its own. He would love the process of
constitutionalism over its product." Those who
prevailed in Connecticut were squarely behind Madison.
Yet, the Constitution, itself, does not require an
unreflective veneration. While in the hierarchy of
constitutional authority in popular culture, the people
are, paradoxically, on the bottom, the oeool. have the
final say on the document. As political scientists, we
should be attentive to how they think and talk about
it. The deference paid to the courts in the area of
constitutional interpretation has discouraged the "non-
expert" from voicing her own views. The testimony
before the Connecticut General Assembly committee,
therefore, offers a rare opportunity to hear people
speak on the Constitution and have their views
recorded
.
While these hearings were held in Connecticut,
they represent more than the parochial concerns of that
state. By the time Connecticut brought up the proposal
of a convention for consideration, 32 out of a
necessary 34 states had voted to call the convention.
Connecticut and Michigan considered the proposal at the
same time with either one possibly being the deciding
state. Consequently, there were national forces
• See Sanford Levinson, Constitut ional Faith ,
p. 11.
organized for and against the call which came to
Connecticut to testify. The chief proponent was the
National Taxpayers Union. The chief opponent was a
coalition of well established groups' called the
"Committee to Save the Constitution." There were also
a number of individual national organizations which
sent representatives to Connecticut to speak for and
against the call for a convention. The testimony from
out of state speakers included that from such figures
as Fay Wattleton, President of Planned Parenthood of
America who spoke in opposition as did Judy Goldsmith,
then-President of the National Organization for Women
and Pierre duPont, former governor of Maryland and
future presidential candidate who spoke in support of
the convention.
The speakers were not representative of the
American public at large. While the record shows
several dozen names of "average citizens" who did not
wait until after one o'clock in the morning to testify,
on the whole, those who spoke did so for themselves as
well as for some group. What we heard in Connecticut
was the polished voice of the well organized interest
• Most prominent among these groups were Common
Cause, the National Organization for Women, Planned
Parenthood, and the American Civil Liberties Union.
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group.- The speakers display a striking
constitutional consciousness, what is most striking
about this constitutional consciousness is that it is
consistently expressed in the language of religious
faith. This language reflects a deep concern for the
Constitution that evinces itself in an attitude of
reverence and protective respect toward the document -
what Madison called a "wonderful veneration" leading
toward stability and Jefferson called "sanctimonious
reverence" leading toward ossification.^ This urge to
protect, however, inhibits constitutional debate and,
in the extreme, paradoxically, makes the Constitution
an impediment to the democracy it defines. For many of
the speakers, a transposition has taken place making
the Constitution -- the document as it is -- not a
product of democracy but rather the democracy itself.
Just as "democracy" as an issue is settled, not open to
discussion, this transposition has removed the
Constitution from genuine debate.
Genuine discussion is what Louis Fisher calls for
in Constitutional Di alogues . 12 He argues that more
xo Interestingly, this voice often spoke
derisively of interest groups. Apparently, in this
area, it does not take one to know one.
11 See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith
pp. 9-10.
12 See generally Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Dialogues
.
than the Supreme Court should form, air, and act on
interpretations of the Constitution. He, l ike Walter
Murphy, envisions a sharing of ultimate authority by
the three branches depending upon the context. Fisher
has gone beyond the hypothetical, however, to show that
this sharing of ultimate interpretive power is, in
fact, the way the American constitutional system
actually works. Fisher's insight and evidence threaten
the myths surrounding what John Brigham calls the "cult
of the court." The image of a singular hold on the
document by the Court weakens under Fisher's
examination. This, according to Brigham, is all to the
good. He argues that
...the Constitution and the Bill of Rights
have become fundamental to modern political
life and appreciated as characteristics of a
"civilized humanism." The promise of
constitutional interpretation is that it
attempts to keep this humanism alive.
Constitutional interpretation dominated by
the Supreme Court truncates that promise. 13
While Fisher is concerned chiefly with calling upon all
three branches to be constitutional interpreters, he,
like Brigham, claims the role for the people as well.
Sotirios Barber, even more direct in his appeal for
popular "constitution mindedness," argues that
At some point the nation has to see and
aspire to its better self. Courts can help
13 See John Brigham, The Cult of the Court, p.
232. Footnote omitted.
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Article V of the Constitution invites the people
to come together in a constitutional convention to have
a dialogue or, in Sanford Levinson's words, a
conversation on the Constitution. The majority of
those testifying in Connecticut, however, would forgo
that opportunity. Not out of apathy certainly but
rather because of a sense that the Constitution has a
sacredness about it that closes it off from public
debate. It, like a religious text, is to be known but
not rewritten. It, like a religious text, has been
handed down to us; written by others of a higher order
who have never again been among us.
There is an interesting dichotomy between those
who favor a convention and those who oppose it. Those
who favor a convention do not treat the text as sacred.
Those who oppose it do. Thomas Emerson, who opposes a
convention call, is typical in his approach saying that
I am testifying here today on behalf of the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union. The
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union has not
taken a position on the merits of a balanced
x « See Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution
Means
.
p. 213.
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On the other side, the fear is instead about larger
deficits. Scott Palmer, Executive Director of the
Taxpayers Foundation was worried about the growing
deficit rather than the Constitution. He argued that
So
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reCOrds show that... civilizationsg ough various stages and one of the
stages they go through right before they fallis when their institutions are captured bvspecial interest (sic) and by bureaucracy and
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hG people wh0 created them.T e Balanced Budget Amendment
... is our chanceto arrest and reverse that process it's
our chance to pull ourselves out of the fire
and keep on going as a free country. 16
The proponents of the convention discuss the issue
essentially in the context of economic necessity. When
they discuss the Constitution specifically, they do so
to point out the "safeguards" that would keep the
convention from "running away." Throughout their
testimony, they are on the defensive and ultimately
fail to prove their case to the committee.
Consequently, the proposal for a second constitutional
convention was killed in committee and never debated by
the full Connecticut General Assembly. The reason for
their defeat is of little interest here but most
probably due to the nature of the by-partisan coalition
1B See GAE Testimony, 3/18/85, p. 506.
16 See GAE Testimony, 3/28/85. p. 569.
Put together by the opponents. Both labor and business
organizations joined with feminist groups l ike NOW and
the National Abortion Rights League and ant i
-feminists
groups like the Eagle Forum to oppose the convention
call. m addition, the leadership of the proponents
reportedly overplayed its hand and alienated some of
its potential supporters.- Consequently, on the level
of popular politics, this drama was a predictable one.
On the level of constitutional politics, however, it
offers an unusual opportunity for us to hear the
Constitution seriously discussed by other than judges.
This is what is of interest here.
The opponents to the call for a convention set the
tone and formulated the language of the discussion.
They cast the testimony in the mold of religious faith.
What is remarkable about this testimony is both what is
said and who is saying it. These espousers of
traditionally conservative arguments are most often
leading liberals.
Taking t he Constitution Seriously
The Joint Standing Committee on Government
Administration and Elections of the Connecticut General
" See "GOP Says Bush Lost, Dole Won in Amendment
Fight." The Hartford Courant May 5 (1985):D1.
Assembly opened its hearings at 11 a.m. on March 1 8/
1985 in the Senate Chambers of the Capitol in Hartford.
Then-Connecticut Senator Lowell P. Weicker was the
first to testify which he did by telephone from
Washington. He set the tone of urgency and fear when
he said "that it is nothing less than the Constitution
of the United States that is at stake here.-- while
reluctant to breech the separation of federal/state
authority, Connecticut's then-junior senator,
Christopher Dodd, nevertheless also felt called upon to
lend his voice to the opposition, reasoning that
"...because of the nature of the issue, obviously the
decision on whether or not to hold a constitutional
convention.
.. is a matter which involves the Federal
Constitution, and therefore I think tit] highly
appropriate to have members from the Federal
legislature in this state to appear before you and to
express their views." 1 *
Like Weicker, Dodd feared for the result of a
second constitutional convention and, calling the
Constitution "our most fundamental document," said
"Thus, by whatever accident of history [you have] the
power to decide whether this issue is of such
significance that we must put our very United States
18 See GAE Testimony, 3/28/85, p. 436.
19 See GAE Testimony, 3/28/85, p. 530.
Constitution at risk. The stakes are beyond
calculation.- Later in his testimony/ Dodd referred
to his "great reverence" for the Constitution which was
written by "remarkable individuals" who "really did
have a vision."- Extending the religious metaphor,
Dodd concluded his testimony with by saying that
The foundation stones of the world's most
stake
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in dem°CraCy at. he risis will be one. No one canpredict the outcome. if we go astray" how
youL" ?fT r t0, histor*? " The choice Isours. if you chose to reject this
resolution you will enjoy, I believe, theblessing of history. 22
While Dodd speaks in the hyperbole of the
politician, he is not alone in the use of this
language. Lawrence Tribe of the Harvard Law School is
frequently quoted by various speakers as having said a
constitutional convention would be "a perilous
undertaking." Thomas Emerson said, "...a
constitutional convention could destroy the whole
system." 23 Samuel Rabinove, Legal Director of the
American Jewish Committee, described his organization
as a national one with 50,000 members which since its
inception in 1906 "has been very concerned about the
20 See GAE Testimony, 3/18/85, p. 532.
2X See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 552.
22 See GAE Testimony, 3/18/85, p. 540.
22 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 513.
constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibility of
all Americans.— He said his committee "believes that
the calls for a constitutional convention are likely to
do more harm than good,... our country may be moving
into a major constitutional crisis which could do
serious damage to the body politic." 25
Scott Feigelstein, Director of the Connecticut
Regional Office of the Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai
B'Rith went further and said, "...The call for a
constitutional convention does violence to the very
democratic traditions and ideals which the
league.
. .have long fought to establish and maintain." 2 "
This sentiment was echoed by Joyce Kathan, Legislative
Chair of the American Association of University Women
who said that
We firmly believe that the calling of a
Constitutional Convention presents a very
real danger to the integrity of the U.S.
Constitution, which is renowned throughout
the world for the protection it affords for
the rights of individuals against the power
of the state ... .Except for a declaration of
war, a call for a Constitutional Convention
is the single most important act our
government could possibly undertake. 27
2 * See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 554.
2B See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 555.
28 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 587.
27 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 713.
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Speaker after speaker portrayed the call for a
constitutional convention as an attack on the
constitution and especially on the Bill of Rights. The
supreme irony, of course, is that it is the
Constitution, itself, where we find the convention
method for amending the document, while the framers of
the Constitution structured the amending process in
such a way as to make it difficult to amend the
document, they did not make it impossible. Nor could
they have and still have claimed to have a democracy.
The "great experiment" of 1787 was to secure a
government in the people's hands by enumerating its
limits in a written constitution, its innovation,
beyond that of the separation of powers structure, was
democracy, itself, in a large republic. The document
was to guarantee the democracy, not replace it.
In the testimony is an unart iculated vision of
what a constitutional convention would be. The
opponents implicitly portrayed a convention as an
assembly that would, on its own and without
ratification by the rest of the country, change the
Constitution in its own narrow interest. Those who
would attend the convention were represented as
minority extremists - the kind of extremist who is
consistently defeated at the polls when they run for
public office. The proponents unsuccessfully tried to
Pierce this i mage
.
LoU is Weber, a political scientist
fro, Kentucky who testified in favor of the convention
suggested an alternative view saying that
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Implicit, too, in the opponents' arguments was a
Picture of an apathetic uninvolved public which could
be easily seduced or circumvented.
The if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it theme persisted
as well throughout the testimony. John Hardiman, a
vice-president with Connecticut Common Cause, described
himself as a "fanatic for the Bill of Rights" and
commented that, "Our form of government is just right
for us." 29 The biggest fear, however, was that there
would be a "runaway convention." Here the worry was
that a convention called to propose a balanced budget
amendment would not be limited to that purpose and
would instead consider amendments such as a "right to
life" amendment, a line-item veto, a return to the gold
standard or some other horrible that was frequently
paraded before the committee. When a member of the GAE
" See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 592.
29 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 718 and 719.
Committee suggested to Judy Goldsmith of NOW that this
might be an opportunity to get the Equal Rights
Amendment into the Constitution, she replied,
-now is
unwilling to risk the threat to our existent
fundamental liberties posed by this call for a
potentially volatile constitutional convention . »«
She, too, closed her remarks in a religious tone by
quoting George Will who had written that
It is alleged in Scripture that Shadrach,
Meshach and Abednego passed through theburning fiery furnace with nary a hair
singed. Perhaps the Constitution could passthrough a convention similarly unscathed.
But that would be a miracle. There are
precedents for miracles, see again Scripture,but it is best to take auxiliary
precautions
.
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This was the chief concern of Thomas Emerson who, in
his testimony argued that
We think that the risks of a constitutional
convention are definitely unacceptably high.
The most important point of a constitutional
convention is the question of whether it can
be limited to a specific subject, or whether
it can roam at will and deal with amendments
to all parts of the Constitution, in effect,
rewriting the Constitution. Constitutional
experts are divided, right down the line on
this question. 3a
This division of opinion on the constitutional
questions involved in a convention was the source of
30 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 618.
31 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 619-20.
32 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 506.
further fear, within the testimony is a constant chant
of "too many unknowns." The proponents of the can
tried to counter this concern with assurances of
"safeguards;" the biggest one beino n, =fu D g that any convention
proposal had to be ratified by the people. The people,
however, were what the opponents feared, state Senator
Lovegrove, a member of the GAP rnmmi*-^un u h. Committee, remarked on
this fear saying that
I
i:
ve°klnd
f
nf
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^
P°nSOrs of th *s resolution.
I hit t 2
madG Up my mind
'
but thingt a just dawned on me, that all the speakerswho oppose this seem to have in common isthat you don't trust the voters who are going
vl hU 6 delegates, to be responsible^ *You don't trust the delegates when chosen torepresent the people of their district orstate to be responsible. You don't trust thelegislature, should an irresponsible
amendment come from this convention to thelegislatures to be adopted. 33
Unlike Senator Lovegrove, State Representative
Jonathan Pelto was anything but sanguine about the
prospect of a convention. He, too, had a deep
constitutional faith. He said that
I'm speaking today on something that I feel
is more important - I feel stronger about it
than perhaps anything I've ever felt before
in my life. The Constitution of the United
States is our greatest and most sacred
document. It is something that we can all
look to as a guiding force in our democratic
lives. It is the reason that I think many of
us feel both comfortable and protected each
and every day that we live. It is something
that is so fundamental to our existence that
that is the reason I rise to oppose a
152
33 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 558-559.
important
0"* 1 amendm«nt, and moreortantly, a constitutions! convention.
I am not a constitutional lawver r am .
ESgLfj— itutionalTonvenrxon is
Ruth Tenza, member of District 1199 ln the Noitheast
Health care Employees Union and "a woman, and a mother
and a registered nurse" testified that
the s Pea*ers talked about fear and
to
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tinllt 1* fSar ltsel£ - I've walked on^ 1 ve "ganized in some tough
ZlSe
iZl
iV'i:eS - 1 WOrk « a Psychiatric
™ It' J been mu99e <3, assaulted, injured
I came he» thl,'^ "Ca" 6aSl1 ^ an* *e„1 ere is morning, I was very
apprehensive about the prospect of aConstitutional Convention. After listeningto more than eight hours of testimony, I amabsolutely terrified at the prospect of aConstitutional Convent ion
.
3a
She then described the Constitution as "the very fabric
of our society." 3 *
Trudy Morrow from North Branford and a naturalized
citizen agreed. She said, "You've got a Constitution
that's really like the rock bed. It isn't just the
deed to my property it is something that you can't
34 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 558-559.
3a See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 664.
3 * See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 665.
even split like an atom... at is God."" The
Constitution was depicted not as the document that
defines our democracy but as the democracy itself. It
is the "very fabric of our society." « It ls God .„ ^
must be "preserved" at all costs - even at the cost of
democracy.
Professor of Law at Western New England College,
Peter Adomeit, said, "A second Constitutional
Convention would place that tezxmilL in danger." and
"You're about to make a political decision of high
importance, and I urge you to protect the Constitution,
and as Lincoln placed the preservation of the union
above all else, so you should place preservation of the
Constitution above all else, including even a balanced
budget.-" The religious metaphor in the testimony
casts the "document" in the mold of the "sacred." As
such, the document is handed down to the people by the
framers and thus to be revered rather than revised.
The document does not simply define and delimit a
government. It constitutes a people; a people cannot
be remade at will. The Constitution that must be
preserved is the specific current document not a
constitutional democracy per se. Martin Margolies who
37 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 678-79.
38 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 684 and 685.
Emphasis added.
Civil Gerties Union alsQ ConstitutiQn Bifch
the country when he spoke. He araued that
go;erns
CTs^Ut j°n ° £ the United Statesyuv s, I submit, not merpiv =o 7,instrument of rules but 11 J aS ,a 1 workln9
of almost religiouS s ni , Symbo1 ' * Symbo1
every one of yS^SJv"?: n^n^atn *o^allegiance to the Constitution anS ^
"n^t^onl! X.t°"S »fiM2c^« the
SS'uSSSIEis becr e the c°-""tton
rl«icV«« V States ' and my God, you areisking losing both. it's not worth i?"-
France is on its sixteenth constitution. it was
France when it wrote its first document and it is still
France after writing fifteen more. Not so for the
United States according to these speakers. if the
Constitution were to be rewritten, it would be the
destruction of one nation and the birth of another.
The United States is a nation of laws not of men.
Originally, this was meant to connote a repudiation of
the divine right of kings. it has come, for these
speakers, to be taken literally. The nation is the
Constitution, not the people who would "tamper" with
the "sacred document." m this testimony, we see the
Constitution become an impediment to the democracy it
symbolizes
.
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39 See GAE Testimony 3/26/85, p. 1481-1482.
It is well known that Thomas Jefferson advocated
that every generation have a constitutional convention.
The United states has not taken Jefferson's advice
believing that on the one hand it has been unnecessary
and on the other that the descendants of the "founding
fathers" were not up to the task. For the opponents of
the call for a second constitutional convention, there
is simply no one today of the calibre of the framers.
Having already depicted the convention as a hotbed of
extremist factions, it was an easy step to cast Jerry
Falwell and Angela Davis in the role of "new framer"
and find the specter ominous.
Ernest Newton, President of the Bridgeport City
Council, found "frightening" the thought of who would
be the new "founders." He was worried about "hidden
agendas" and that blacks would not be fairly
represented. "So I am totally against it," he said and
then asked, "[Do] we have a new founding fathers...?
[That question] is frightening to me."" The fact
that it is slavery and not the rights of black
Americans that the first founding fathers protected is
lost on Mr. Newton. The years have faded that stain on
the document. In the fervor of their worship of the
original framers, the speakers become revisionist
historians attributing the gloss put on the
•4 O See GAE Testimony 3/26/85, p. 1409.
Constitution by the mere mortals of the 20th century to
the slave-holding demi-gods of the 18th.
Maintaining the vision of the framers is an
important sub-text of the testimony. At times there is
a sense that it is tfcajJL document that we are only
holding for safe keeping. At other times, however, the
speakers articulate their own sense of what does and
does not belong in the Constitution. Their opposition
to the balanced budget amendment springs from their
vision of what purpose the Constitution serves in their
own estimation. Thomas Emerson spells this out in his
testimony saying that
The Constitution, by and large, is a document
which spells out the structure of government
and the rights of individuals, viz a viz
government power. It does not spell out
specific economic or social policies. The
only occasion on which our Constitution was
amended to deal with a social policy was a
prohibition amendment, the 18th amendment,
and that was repealed in the 21st amendment.
It was a disaster. Those questions should bedealt with in accordance with our present
constitutional structure. They should not be
incorporated into the Constitution
itself « l
Senator Dodd was also worried that "temporary problems"
would find "a home in something that was not a
temporary document."* 2 State Representative Dudchik
argued that a balanced budget amendment "would be a
-41 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 510.
* 2 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 552.
violation of the spirit and purpose of the United
Stated constitution. Fiscal policy has no place in
fundamental law of the republic.
.. .Loading the
Constitution with policy preference cheapens the
document
.
M<* a
The recurring thought was that the Constitution is
a "fundamental law" not a list of policy preferences.
This was not just the vision of the framers but of
these speakers, themselves. There is a vacillation,
then, between keeping the flame alive in the temple of
the founding fathers and asserting their own sense of
constitutionalism, of course, their own sense is
closely aligned with what they perceived to be that of
the framers. Interestingly, not once did any of these
speakers who had such a strong sense of what the
framers wanted and what they, themselves, wanted in the
Constitution did any of them suggest that they were the
likely candidates to be delegates to a constitutional
convention
.
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+ 3 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 615.
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* In a conversation with the author on June 27,
1989, William Olds, Executive Director of the
Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, said that should the
convention be called, the CCLU would immediately work
to get delegates compatible with the CCLU elected. He
did not see the CCLU pursuing a strategy of fighting
through litigation the legitimacy of some of the
previous votes taken in other states.
The urge to preserve and protect goes beyond the
words on the paper. The opponents were concerned about
enforceability as well. if an amendment were
unenforceable, it would undermine the overall authority
of the document. The ghost of prohibition was raised
by several besides Thomas Emerson above. A University
of Connecticut political scientist said, "We've had one
clear precedent of trying to enact a public policy by
amending the Constitution, and that was the infamous
prohibition amendment which took us decades to recover
from.
. . .
The dialogue between the opponents and the
proponents around the issue of enforceability brought
out two visions of how the Constitution actually works.
The picture we get from the proponents is that of a
self-actualizing document. A minister who favored the
call believed that, "the amendment drafted and approved
would mandate some common sense."* 6 Another said "Let
me prove the point that words on the paper of the
Constitution do solve problems .. .as long as the Supreme
Court respects the Constitution and as long as we
respect the Supreme Court, those words have
meaning .... I As J a matter of mechanism, the framers in
4B See GAE Testimony 3/16/85, p. 1431.
** See GAE Testimony 3/26/85, p. 1435.
Philadelphia gave you a way.^ For these proponentS/
enforcement of the Constitution is an automatic
"mechanical" process. Mr. Palmer of the Taxpayers
Foundation testified that
The Congress has tried honestly, I believe tohold down spending. President Reagan has tried
astern T^** C*™0t ^^1 the ofsystem that rewards increased spending andpunishes fiscal responsibility.^
implicitly, then, when all else fails, put it in the
Constitution and then the issue, removed from
"politics," can be resolved.
Representative Dudchik with his usual passion,
counters this thinking saying that
...despite the warnings of our founding
fathers, proponents of this resolution to
mandate federal balanced budgets have flocked
to the Constitution as the Cowardly Lion to
the Wizard of Oz, to plead for courage and
discipline that they have been unable to
force upon themselves This resolution is
the easy way out, a political quick fix.
It's political cowardice at its worst, it is
evasive, unworthy, and essentially a
political exercise. I'll finish by saying,
the oldest living Constitution in the world
should not be dragged on stage to perform
such charades. * s
When it came to the issue of enforceability, the
opponents change from reverent apostles of the faith to
pragmatic politicians who look to the bottom line.
« 7 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 573 and p. 575.
* B See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 617.
4 » See GAE Testimony 3/28/85, p. 617.
There is only a brief digression to political
realities, however. Generally, in spite of the fact
that the speakers were with few exceptions seasoned
politicians and lobbyists, there was little evidence in
their testimony that they had ever witnessed politics
at work. While they, themselves, were members of a
traditionally moderate to conservative general
assembly, they feared that the electorate who had sent
them to Hartford as legislators would choose the head
of the Communist Party or the Klu Klux Klan when it
came to selecting delegates to a constitutional
convention. These same politically savy people to whom
the use of parliamentary maneuver had become second
nature feared they would have to stand idly by as
"extremists" steamrolled away the United States as they
knew it.
Not everyone who testified in opposition believed
that reverence for the Constitution meant leaving it as
it is. Hugh McGill, Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs at the University of Connecticut School of Law,
testified that
I happen to think that all constitutional law
that passes through the rules that we know,
rests upon an underlying political consensus
and a bed or seed really, of constitutional
politics and I am as exillerated (sic) as I
am scared of what would happen if we took the
lid of rules off and allowed the people
directly to reconsider the basic
possibilities upon which they wish theirgovernment to be framed and conducted =°
This spirit was shared by one of the political
scientists who testified in favor of the call, Clyde
McKee of Trinity College in Hartford, who asked
t^ are K 6 S ° reluctant to use the procedureshat we have had for nearly 200 years"?Because we are fearful that we lack the
courage, the wisdom and the talent to makethem skillfully? What will happen if we donot practice using these constitutionalprocedures for another 200 years? We maybecome so Dolitirsl l v i m™4-««+- ... . "fp cal y impotent that we will
>le to gove;
democratic nation. 51
be incapabl ern [sic] ourselves
Conclus i nn
What we learn from the testimony in Connecticut is
that the Constitution commands an extraordinary
reverence; and, that this reverence has truncated
genuine discussion of it. The recent calls from Louis
Fisher and Sanford Levinson for dialogues and
conversation and from John Brigham and Sotirios Barber
for greater popular participation in giving meaning to
the document fall on mostly deaf ears. Sanford
Levinson's Constitutional Faith pointed out an
ambivalence between "patriotism measured as commitment
so See GAE Testimony 2/18/85, p. 575.
31 See GAE Testimony 3/18/85, p. 577.
to constitution*! ideals « and »a wariness about a too-
eager willingness to celebrate one's own country,
including the celebration o£ its constitution.-!
bevinson warns against a constitutional faith that is
all celebration and which stops short of seeking new
answers through deeper conversations. His hope is that
the Constitution will provide the language for that
conversation. if out of a misplaced reverence,
however, we limit the use of this language to nine
"high priests," the Constitution will fail us as that
common tongue.
A political scientist had the last word on the
subject of a second constitutional convention before
the committee. in, perhaps fitting, juxtaposition to
the first speaker who saw a constitutional convention
as too great a risk, John Rourke offered a little-heard
view saying that
The delegates to the constitutional
convention, ah, some were brilliant, some
were mundane. Mr. Hamilton wanted to have a
king. What I'm concerned about is democracy.
What I support philosophically is the idea
that we need to look at our system
periodically. That we probably need to
change our system or at least consider very
seriously change to our system. That we
ought to give as much democracy to the people
as we can. 83
32 See GAE Testimony 4/2/85, p. 1980.
See GAE Testimony 4/1/85, p. 1980.
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While the Constitution can be encased in
Plexiglass and enshrined beyond our touch in order to
preserve it, democracy can not be encased in that way
and really be preserved. Democracy requires an on-
going self-analysis and all the risk that entails.
This appeared unclear to many who testified in
Connecticut. Only with reluctance could a few of the
opponents justify a second constitutional convention
for any reason and then only in the case of something
like the Civil War or the Great Depression. There was
an unarticulated sense that a second constitutional
convention would somehow not be legitimate.
Apparently, our otherwise perfect Constitution is
flawed in Article V.
CHAPTER 6
.
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS-
INTERPRETIVE ACTIVITY IN AMERICA
Why study constitutional politics? I claimed at
the beginning of this dissertation that the public law
field has gone astray by limiting itself to the
Constitution in the appellate courts, and especially
the Supreme Court, when the full picture of American
constitutional politics is more than this. A
perspective limited to the Const itut ion-in-the-courts
binds us to the concept of constitutionalism as a
purely judicial activity. This leads us to think the
Constitution can be handled only by legal professionals
and then we fail to recognize its handling by others as
constitutional politics. Professors, congressmen,
lawyers and citizens of various sorts take the document
into their own hands every day. When we ignore this
activity we fail to understand how the Constitution
functions in our society. In this dissertation, I have
examined constitutional politics within four
frameworks: non- instrumental constitutional politics,
competition among theoretical views of
constitutionalism, the elevation of the document above
politics, and institutional life as a key to
constitutional politics.
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Participation in constitution! politic, is not
always aimed at affecting specific policy ootco.es.
Constitutional pol itics as it u presented ^ ^ ^
instrumental than litigation before the cou rts
. The
aim is often to construct the conceptual terrain
"hich broad policy choices will be made. Th
steelworks of Pennsylvania and Ohio wanted to take
their fight against corporate disinvestment out of the
courts where communitarian values have received less
recognition to the community which has authority to
construct a new constitutional claim developed from the
eminent domain power. Using the eminent domain
authority to stave off corporate disinvestment required
the community's coming to a new understanding of the
property interest that the Constitution protects. The
community of displaced workers and movement lawyers'
struggle to reshape its thinking on the Constitution
and its promise is at the heart of constitutional
politics
.
The community property right movement does not
look to the Supreme Court for affirmation of its claim
or characterize policy problems in the simple "rights
and remedies" fashion that Stuart Scheingold warned
would undermine social transformation. The myth of
change through the acquisition of legally defined and
protected individual rights is pierced in this
struggle. Instead, the community focuses on replacing
part of the present culture of individual competition
and reward with a more communal social order using the
tactics of grassroots democratic action to educate the
public on the issues and build consensus around shared
values. This is part of that process that Gerald
Garvey calls determining society's syntax discussed in
the introduction. Under this reading, the Constitution
is understood not as a blueprint for a community but
rather as a facilitator of social conversation on what
constitutes the community. James Boyd White points to
this activity of facilitation of conversation as
necessary to the achievement of cultural change saying
that
To conceive of the law as a rhetorical and
social system, a way in which we use an
inherited language to talk to each other and
to maintain a community, suggests in a new
way that the heart of law is what we always
knew it was: the open hearing in which one
point of view, one construction of language
and reality, is tested against another. The
multiplicity of readings that the law permits
is not its weakness but its strength, for it
is this that makes room for different voices
mnH^j^V Purchase by which culture may beodified in response to the demands of
circumstance
.
1
The scholars who convened the Bicentennial
Conference were also less interested in defining
specific policy choices than in expanding the sources
of constitutional meaning and thereby expanding the
domain of American constitutional politics. They would
define constitutionalism as rights consciousness and
look to 19th century constitutional consciousness to
recall the scope of the American constitutional
tradition. That tradition includes the view that
constitutional arguments are not furthered solely
through litigation but in convention debates and
through personal correspondence as well. it was
incumbent upon 19th century citizens to form their own
views on the Constitution and promulgate them. The
Bicentennial scholars' work recalls and promotes this
tradition thus broadening constitutional politics
today.
Congress is an active participant in
constitutional interpretation and thus expands
constitutional politics beyond the door of the Supreme
1 See James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their
Meaning;
—
Constitutions and Reconstitutes of
Language, Character, and Community
.
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 273. This
depiction does not acknowledge the power the status quo
has over law, however.
constitutional politics beyond the door of the Supreme
Court. Here too, the activity often falls into general
rather than specific policy areas. Congress is most
concerned with having ascendance over that part of the
Constitution dealing with its own powers. Louis Fisher
makes the case that Congress defers to the Court
generally but not in the area of separation of powers.
Here Congress employs its law firms to argue its own
interpretation before the Court forgoing the use of the
solicitor general's office in order to stake out
Congress' domain of interpretive practice.
In Connecticut, the specific policy debate over a
balanced budget amendment gave way to broader concerns
about appropriate arenas for constitutional
discussions. The question there was whether or not
constitutional debate should be broadened into the
convention setting. This could open all aspects of the
Constitution to revision as well as appoint a whole new
set of official interpreters in the form of convention
delegates offering the clearest opportunity to expand
interpretive practice beyond the Supreme Court.
Competing Theories of
Constitutionalism
Part of this interpretive practice focuses on the
competition among theoretical views. Testing competing
readings of the Constitution was the work of the
scholars attending the Bicentennial Conference at
Amherst. There the competing views of constitutional
interpretation were resurrected from history.
Recalling the interpretations that did not win out in
the struggle for meaning casts in sharper relief the
views that did win out as well as the fact of multiple
possibilities of interpretation. While popular rights
consciousness has been pervasive in American politics,
the vision of what the Constitution protects and
promises has not always been the same. Recapturing
alternative views from the past extends the present
possibilities for the document. The hold that
tradition has on the document is lessened when we see
that the view that won out was not a monolithic one
even in its own time.
The scholarly activity shared at the Bicentennial
Conference is in the tradition of Herbert J. Storing
who reminded us "what the anti-federalists were for." 2
Their rejection of the Constitution of 1787 was in
light of an alternative plan not simply as obstruction.
Those whose 19th century discourse on the document is
recounted at the Conference were also not simply
against something but rather offered viable
alternatives. Keeping alive the recognition that the
2 See Herbert J. Storing, What the Antl-
Federalists Were For (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1981).
document has always been open to competing
interpretations is an important enterprise in itself.
The steelworkers put to the test the view that the
Constitution is the people's document - available for
their own direct interpretation even outside the
amendment process. Establishing the concept of a
community property right using a community's eminent
domain power challenges traditional theories of
constitutional interpretation. Here, the community is
arguing that a court's interpretation is not necessary
and, furthermore, neither is a constitutional
amendment. When Judge Gibson argued for the people as
final interpreter in Eakin v. Rauh.=» he posited the
amending process as the mechanism of that
interpretation. Community property rights activists
believe their coordinate and equal authority over the
document exists as direct interpreters without falling
back on the amendment process. This, of course, is a
radical challenge to contemporary constitutional
interpretive theory which is dominated by variations of
judicial review.
Congress challenges traditional judicial review
theory as well. Harkening back to early republican
arguments most strongly pressed by Thomas Jefferson, we
can see Congress asserting its own variation on
3 12 Sergeant & Rawle (S.C. Pa. 1825).
departmentalism.* Unlike Thomas Jefferson, however,
Congress does not claim to have coordinate and equal
authority in all areas of interpretation. Congress
willingly defers to the Supreme Court in all those
areas not pertaining to separation of powers questions.
In that area, Congress feels fully competent and equal
to the Supreme Court as an interpreter. While this, no
doubt, raises questions in many minds, theorists like
Walter Murphy and Louis Fisher endorse Congress'
interpretive practices as both constitutional and
feasible
.
While these constitutional theorists argue among
themselves, those in Connecticut argue with the
Constitution. The framers believed that should
Congress attempt to forestall a popular movement to
amend the Constitution by refusing to propose an
amendment, the people could nevertheless have their way
by calling for a constitutional convention. The
majority of the people testifying at the Connecticut
hearings, however, argued for a constitutional theory
* "The Constitution has erected no such single
tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with
the corruptions of time and party, its members would
become despots. It is more wisely made all the
departments co-equal and co-sovereign with themselves."
Letter to William Jarvis September 28, 1820, Paul L.
Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York:
Putnam's, 1905), XII, 161-164. In Walter F. Murphy et
al., American Constitutional Interpretation (Mineola,
New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1986).
that would remove the document as far as possible from
amendment by the people. Under their reading of
constitutionalism, democracy is attached to the
existence of the document not to democratic practice.
Article V of the Constitution opens the document to
revision at the will of the people through a proposal
from Congress or a convention. This is
constitutionalism as process. Where the process is the
convention method, however, supporters of democracy in
Connecticut fall away.
Elevating the Const- i t ut ion Ahn Ve Polihir-^
Those who testified in Connecticut on the call for
a second constitutional convention appeared to be
blinded by their commitment to the "document of the
framers" and thus lost sight of the fact that there has
always been competition over how the Constitution
should be understood and that competition is healthy.
Those who opposed a second constitutional convention
did so because they viewed the Constitution as a
blueprint no longer subject to revision. This is a
vision of a constitution that functions as an end to
debate rather than a facilitator of it. The tenor of
the Connecticut testimony was one of fear and
apprehension about opening the document to revision or
reinterpretation
.
Here the Constitution is a list of
settled claims and consequently to reopen discussion is
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reinterpretation. Here the Constitution is a list of
settled claims and consequently to reopen discussion is
to deny where agreement has been found. Therefore the
politics center on keeping the debate closed even
though part of the enterprise of constitutional
interpretation includes not only reinterpretation but
reaffirmation of settled concepts. This requires
ongoing open debate as well.*
The scholars of the Bicentennial Conference
willingly participate in a ongoing open discourse but
they too attempt to elevate the Constitution to a
status above politics. This becomes clearest when Mark
Tushnet' s essay is juxtaposed with the others. For
Tushnet, the Constitution does not hold special meaning
or at least does not provide special protections
unavailable from the political process. For the
others, it does. Rights are essentially rooted in the
Constitution and above the play of politics. While
there can be some debate and disagreement, the
Constitution keeps everything from being up for grabs.
Tushnet argues that everything is always up for grabs
and thus there must be constant vigilance based on
3 In Connecticut, the opponents to a second
convention succeeded. What remains to be studied are
the debates in the other states where the question was
raised and answered affirmatively to hold another convention.
political action. The Constitution, according to
Tushnet, doesn't secure rights but rather obscures the
need for political action.
At the end of a pursuit through traditional
business, political, and legal practices, the
steelworkers jobs were still up for grabs and thus
these workers turned to the Constitution to raise the
ante in the fight for job security. what no one and
nothing else could do to save jobs, the Constitution
was called upon to do as job security was re-conceived
as a constitutional community property right. Here the
Constitution is a shield from socioeconomic forces
rather than a mechanism through which politics is
played out.
Congress would have us understand that their
interest in constitutional interpretation is not self
interested but rather for the purpose of remaining true
to the document. The document demands a standard and
adherence to certain principles that removes some
activity from the realm of pure politics. When
Congress protects its institutional powers under the
separation of powers clause then, it does so, in its
view, in order to remain true to the framers • vision
and the requirements of constitutional government.
Left free to its own devices, Congress might act
otherwise, it i mp i ie s, but being bound to the document,
it is bound to its higher orders.
Instit-.m-jnp^ U f e as a ^ ¥n
Const j t-nh j n na l pnl ihip C
Congress is the strongest competitor for the role
of constitutional interpreter with the Supreme Court.
Every time Congress writes a law it is participating in
constitutional interpretation. Even here, however,
Congress' view is popularly placed second to that of
the Court as tentative, needing Court endorsement.
This is not Congress' view of its role, however. We
can see this most clearly in its response to the Chadha
decision.
Congress 1 instituting its own law offices has
given it an institutional mechanism through which to
formally interpret the document and press that
interpretation forward. This activity not only
furthers what Sotirios Barber calls "constitution
mindedness," it cements the principle of separation of
powers - the fundament of our constitutional system.
Consequently, fears voiced around the "problem" of
having multiple interpreters are misplaced because this
is not only within the bounds of American
political/constitutional theory, it is the way our
constitutional system has always worked. Louis
Fisher's research in this area has produced compelling
evidence of this fact. Pisher shows congress as the
Court's constitutional colleague working with the Court
not against it.
The executive, too, commonly offers its own
constitutional interpretations. More research is
needed here to fully understand the way all three
branches handle the document. when the executive began
in the 1920's to refuse automatically to defend,
through the solicitor general, acts of Congress, it was
asserting itself as the third constitutional colleague.
This change in the practice of the executive's always
defending acts of congress through the office of
solicitor general eventually brought about the
institution of Congress' Constitutional law offices so
that it would have its own advocate before the Court.
This is fertile ground for further research on
separation of powers and the constitutional
interpretive practices of the three branches.
Institutional life is a key to constitutional
politics and the case of Congress makes this point but
others do as well. The scholars at the Bicentennial
Conference are from the elite law schools from which
future constitutional lawyers, judges, and justices
come. Their vision of the Constitution and their own
role in constitutional interpretive practice determines
in large measure that of their institutions. These
teachers are significant to constitutional politics
because of their institutional affiliations. Part of
their politics is the influencing of not only their
students, but their institutions. These institutions
are essentially attached to the profession of law
which, in turn, is essentially attached to popular
perceptions of American constitutionalism.
Fundamental to the legitimation of the concept of
a constitutional community property right was first the
endorsement of the idea by religious institutions and
then later by governmental ones. Without these
institutions lending their authority to the concept, it
would have remained a radical idea outside mainstream
politics. One of the most interesting aspects of the
steelworkers' case is the phenomenon of these
institutions embracing the concept.
Looking at the role state legislatures play is
another institutional key to constitutional politics.
Whether or not there would be a second constitutional
convention was determined by a handful of legislators.
In Connecticut, institutional rules enabled the
opponents to the convention call to defeat the proposal
in committee where the fewest opposition votes were
necessary. This is in striking contrast to the
practice of a popular referendum for which proponents
argued unsuccessfully.
The Constitution is attentive to various
institutions, checking and balancing powers among them
all. While the framers wanted the people to be able to
circumvent Congress to amend the Constitution, they
nevertheless did not put that power in the peoples-
hands directly but rather placed it in the institutions
of the state legislatures. This keeps the question of
whether or not to call for a constitutional convention
a public responsibility instead of an individual
preference. The testimony before the committee
confirms this as when it frequently refers to the power
and responsibility that the committee holds. It is as
members of a committee that they are to decide on the
convention call. Consequently, the arguments used for
and against appeal not to individual citizens but to
institutional actors.
Conclusion
The significance of the politics examined in this
thesis rests as much in the fact of these politics as
in its content. We do not have a new dominant vision
of constitutional property thanks to the s teelworkers
.
They have, however, planted a seed that may in time
bear further fruit. For now, their most important
contribution is in encouraging other than legal
professionals to take the document into their own
hands. The Bicentennial Conference scholars' task was,
perhaps, easier. Their goal was to further the use of
the language of rights in discourse on the
Constitution. This is well within the American
constitutional tradition. They, too, however, were
seeking to open up new ground for debate. m recalling
nineteenth century discourse they, like the
steelworkers, were hailing a more communitarian thrust
in constitutional interpretation. While those
testifying in Connecticut appeared to be
obstructionists to interpretation rather than
interpreters themselves, they were, in fact, also
participating in constitutional interpretative
practice. Their interpretation of the document and of
constitutionalism is that it is a list of settled
expectations - not a foundation for open debate. They
see "constitution mindedness" as most appropriate for
the Supreme Court. Their constitution is a judicial
rather than a political document and thus best left in
the hands of those trained in the law. Congress, on
the other hand, does see the Constitution as a
political document — what better branch to handle it
than the peoples' branch? it is, after all, a question
of handling it rather than monopolizing it. Congress
does not claim it should have the final say on the
Constitution. it does claim (through its actions) to
have authority over interpretation in those areas where
congressional interest and expertise come into the
fore, however.
Congress, the steelworkers, the Bicentennial
Scholars, and those testifying in Connecticut are all
"constitution minded." Their attention to the document
calls for our attention to them. This dissertation has
exposed some of the constitutional interpretive
practices taking place outside the Courts and it calls
upon the public law field to take account of this
political activity as constitutional interpretive
practice. It has also taken on Martin Shapiro's
essential task of the political scientist --
undertaking the "careful description of what one real
person says to another real person, when, how, and why"
and found that real people — not just courts —
are talking to other real people about the
Constitution. Ultimately, it is this conversation
that, together with the views of the courts, forms the
full picture of American constitutional politics.
Society needs to build consensus on policy issues.
Part of this process is carried on in the language and
syntax o £ the Constitution. Whlle maklnq tne Supreme
court the Oracle at Delphi truncates that process,
constitutional politics helps.
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